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"I Saw That It Was Holy": The Black Hills and
the Concept of Sacred Land
Richard Pemberton, Jr.*
"Hear me, four quarters of the world-a relative I am! Give
me the strength to walk the soft earth, a relative to all that is!
... With your power only can I face the winds."1
Black Elk
"I never want to leave this country; all my relatives are lying




"The more you think about this, the more meaning you will
see in it."3
Black Elk
I. The Origins of Difference: Religious and Cultural Assumptions
In 1877, Congress voted to transfer the ownership of the
Black Hills from the Lakota and Dakota Indian nations4 to the
United States. No doubt government officials hoped that, in time,
* Richard Pemberton is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota. Au-
thor's acknowledgment: I thank Jane Larson, my editor and friend, for the inesti-
mable contribution she has made to this article. Jane's efforts on the article's
behalf began when it was only an idea, and have persisted through its publication.
Her editorial suggestions reflected a profound understanding of my purposes for
writing the piece, and an empathy with my voice as a writer. Should this article
prove useful to American Indians struggling to regain their land, much of the credit
is Jane's.
1. Black Elk Speaks 6 (John Neihardt ed. 1961).
2. Dee Brown, Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee 274 (1970).
3. Black Elk Speaks, supra note 1, at 204.
4. Throughout this article, I use several names when referring to its principal
subjects. "Sioux" is the recognized name for the Indian tribes living in the
Dakotas, but, like so many names Native American tribes bear, it is ethnocentric,
inaccurate, and useful only for easy classification. In traditional times, the Sioux
formed three major groups: the Santees, the Yanktons, and the Tetons. As an Eng-
lish convention, we now identify the various tribes as part of either the Lakota or
Dakota nations. The Oglala tribe, referred to throughout my article, is a Lakota
group, and claims the membership of the renowned Holy Man, Black Elk. At vari-
ous times, I refer to "the Sioux nation," "the Lakota and/or Dakota peoples," "the
Oglala," "the Great Plains Indians," and "the Black Hills people."
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the Sioux would accept Congress' unilateral decision to seize the
Hills as government property. Although over a century has passed
since this theft of Indian land, the Lakota and Dakota nations still
continue a legal and political struggle to regain the Hills.
The Indians' persistent effort to live and worship in the Hills
is an essential expression of their cultural and spiritual identity.
The Lakota and Dakota, like other American Indians, derive reli-
gious, cultural, and political values from their relationship to sa-
cred tribal land. The Black Hills have deep spiritual meaning for
the Lakota and Dakota peoples. They therefore reject the Anglo-
European concept of property ownership upon which the United
States bases its claim to ownership and control of the Hills. In-
stead, the Indians argue what they believe are their fundamental
rights to regain the land which is central to their religion and cul-
ture, raising legal claims based on property rights and religious
freedom theories.
To the outside observer, it would seem that the Lakota and
Dakota nations already succeeded in their struggle to have their
property claims recognized. In United States v. Sioux Nation of In-
dians ,5 the Supreme Court awarded the Indians substantial money
damages for the loss of the Black Hills. This victory is apparent,
not real. Most tribes comprising the Sioux nation have refused to
accept the money. Exchanging land for dollars contradicts the
Lakota and Dakota peoples' most fundamental religious and cul-
tural convictions. Worse, the Sioux Nation precedent has barred
subsequent legal efforts to gain rights to live and worship in the
Hills free from the encroachment of white civilization.
Having failed to regain the land itself, the Lakota and Dakota
peoples have tried to regain rights to worship in the Hills through
the free exercise clause of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution. The Indians have argued that lack of mean-
ingful access to the Hills denies them religious freedom. South
Dakota state courts and federal courts, like courts throughout the
country considering similar Indian religious freedom cases, have
denied these claims.
To deny Indians first amendment protection of religious be-
liefs and practices, these courts have defined religious faith and
practices as Anglo-European religious traditions define them. In
ways vital to the legal consequences of this ethnocentric perspec-
tive, Indian religion is distinct from the dominant culture's reli-
gious traditions. American Indians do not separate religion from
5. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). This case is discussed infra notes 64-90 and accompany-
ing text.
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culture, the sacred from the secular, belief from practice, or spiri-
tuality from traditional sacred lands. This inseparability, foreign
to Western religion, has been ignored or denied by the courts, re-
sulting in inadequate first amendment protection for American
Indians.
Recognizing that existing first amendment precedent inade-
quately protected Indian religious freedom, Congress passed the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act in 1978.6 Congress in-
tended the Act as a mandate to federal agencies and courts review-
ing agency decisions to end the historical repression of Indian
religious practices, ensuring Indian worshippers access to religious
sites on lands they no longer own.
Rather than interpreting the first amendment in terms of the
Act's requirement that Indian religions be respected, however,
courts have treated the Act as a mere procedural formality.
Courts have ruled that federal agencies deciding whether to de-
velop land sacred to an Indian tribe fully comply with the Act if
their official records reflect that the agency "considered" Indian
religious interests. By refusing to adopt a more meaningful stan-
dard of judicial review, courts abdicate their responsibility to pro-
tect Indians' constitutional rights and grant power to rule on issues
involving Indian religious freedom to federal agencies without
competence or constitutional authority.
Some courts have gone further, justifying their refusal to pro-
tect the existence of or access to Indian religious sites on the
ground that such protection would constitute government promo-
tion of Indian religion, violating the establishment clause of the
first amendment. The 1984 Supreme Court decision in Lynch v.
Donnelly,7 however, reinterprets the establishment clause to re-
quire the government to act affirmatively to accommodate all reli-
gions. Depending on its interpretation, Lynch may either weaken
the judicial rationale for declining to protect Indian access to reli-
gious sites or reinforce courts' assumptions that because Christian-
ity is the dominant American religion, the government should
promote Christian traditions and symbols. The latter reading
would further impede Indian efforts to achieve constitutional pro-
tection of their religions.
Whether through a theory of Indian property rights or one of
Indian religious freedom, the government must recognize and pro-
tect Indian first amendment rights and the land interests those
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). The Act is discussed infra notes 132-41 and accom-
panying text.
7. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984), reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 2376 (1984).
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rights imply. At this point in history, it seems unlikely that the
government will return vast tracts of land to the American Indi-
ans. If, however, the government continues to deny Indians' rights
to protect their cultural/religious interests in land, it will continue
its historical suppression of Indian belief and life. For American
Indians, the right to protect sacred land is not a matter of prefer-
ence but of survival. Destroying sacred land means destroying In-
dian religion, tradition, and identity.8
A. Lakota/Dakota Religious Belief Spirit
and Nature Unified
Before his people lost the right to live and worship in the
Black Hills, Henry Black Elk had a vision:
I was still on my bay horse, and once more I felt the riders of
the west, the north, the east, the south, behind me in forma-
tion, as before, and we were going east. I looked ahead and
saw the mountains there with rocks and forests on them, and
from the mountains flashed all colors upward to the heavens.
Then I was standing on the highest mountain of them all, and
round about beneath me was the whole hoop of the world.
And while I stood there I saw more than I can tell and I un-
derstood more than I saw; for I was seeing in a sacred manner
the shapes of all things in the spirit, and the shape of all
shapes as they must live together like one being. And I saw
that the sacred hoop of my people was one of many hoops that
made one circle, wide as daylight and as starlight, and in the
center grew one mighty flowering tree to shelter all the chil-
dren of one mother and one father. And I saw that it was
holy.9
Black Elk sees a cosmos pulsating with energy, yet unified
and concentric. He both witnesses and acts in the drama of his vi-
sion. Though he sees a world transcendent of space and time, he
neither journeys exclusively into the landscape of his psyche nor
into a nether world severed from the physical one he knows. In-
stead, he stands on Harney Peak in Paha Sapa (the Black Hills),o
a place as real to the senses as to the spirit.
Indeed, the spatial dimensions of Black Elk's vision become
its spiritual content. The four winds energize the universe
through the struggle of their polarity, and order it because they
share an original and common center.l' Thus, every being on
8. Although this article focuses on the Lakota and Dakota peoples' effort to
regain the Black Hills, its arguments apply to the struggle of all American Indians
to protect their sacred lands.
9. Black Elk Speaks, supra note 1, at 42-43 (footnote omitted).
10. Id. at 43.
11. James Walker, Lakota Myth 47-48, 58-89, 103-04 (1983).
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earth circles the life source and has a place on the world's sacred
hoop. Black Elk sees his own people as "one of many hoops that
make one circle," drawing life and taking shelter under "one
mighty flowering tree" in the center. The eternal pervades the
temporal; the material world is of sacred character. As Black Elk
concludes, "I saw that it was holy."
For Black Elk and his people, the sacred and the secular, the
divine and the material creation, are joined. The Platonic dichot-
omy between soul and body informing European thought does not
govern in Lakota belief. 12 Space, the physical and material dimen-
sion, has a sacred aspect. Lakota creation myths begin with the
founding of the four directions. The circle and its center, poeti-
cally realized in Black Elk's vision, become the pattern of many
Lakota rituals. Black Elk says, for example, that the Oglala Sun
Dance is held during the full moon (itself a circle) of June and
July, and that the rite originated when "[o]ur people were once
camped in a good place, in a circle, of course."' 3 The celebrants
dance around a tree (symbolic of life's source), and move from
each of the four directions into the center, back out again, and re-
turn to the center, "and in this way... ma[k]e a path in the shape
of a cross.'14
Not only space, but all forms in creation have a sacred char-
acter. Thus, Black Elk describes the many kinds of life celebrated
in the Sun Dance:
Also the moon lives twenty-eight days, and this is our month;
each of these days of the month represents something sacred
to us: two of the days represent the Great Spirit; two are for
Mother Earth; four are for the four winds; one is for the Spot-
ted Eagle; one is for the sun; and one for the moon; one is for
the Morning Star; and four for the four ages; seven are for our
seven great rites; one is for the buffalo; one for fire; one for
water; one for the rock; and finally one is for the two-legged
people.15
12. For Plato, the objects comprising the natural world are imperfect imitations
of ideal concepts incapable of physical embodiment. While the physical world rep-
resents these ideals, it is fundamentally unreal and a mere shadow of the ideal
realm. Such qualities as Beauty and Truth are, therefore, paradigms never fully re-
alized in nature. Plato's teachings influenced early Christian thought, and particu-
larly the writings of Paul. When the Christian Reformation revived the New
Testament's Pauline books, the Platonic dichotomy between body and soul, and be-
tween the physical and ideal worlds, was again expressed. Plato has influenced
Western thought immensely. According to the American transcendentalist Ralph
Waldo Emerson, "Plato is philosophy and philosophy is Plato." See generally Great
Dialogues of Plato (W.H.D. Rouse trans., Eric Warmington & Philips Rouse eds.
1956).
13. Black Elk, The Sacred Pipe 67 (Joseph Epes Brown ed. 1971).
14. Id. at 81.
15. Id. at 80.
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This eclectic symbolism expresses the Oglala's sense of an inte-
grated creation. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God forms the
earth out of nothingness, and stands over it. The Lakota see the
Great Spirit and Mother Earth as mutually creative forces. In-
deed, one Lakota creation story tells that life began when the
sun's warmth and life-giving power impregnated the earth.16
Earthly life forms (the spotted eagle and the buffalo), natural ele-
ments (the winds, fire, water, rock and earth), the heavenly bodies
(the moon, the morning star), the Great Spirit, and men and wo-
men are all celebrated in the Sun Dance. The Sun Dance also
gives time a holy meaning. The moon's twenty-eight day cycle be-
comes the numerical pattern of the dance's symbolism as the
Lakota celebrate Creation's four ages.
B. Lakota/Dakota Religion and the Land
To understand the relationship between the Lakota and Da-
kota nations and the Black Hills, one must first appreciate these
people's relationship to the earth and how this formed their con-
ception of land. Though discussions of nature's spiritual character
for Indians have become clich6, few white people have evaluated
their own beliefs in response to this differing perspective. The
Plains Indians see the earth not only as Mother in the procreative
sense, but as the source of all kinship. Thus, an Oglala prayer
says: "0 You, Grandmother and Mother Earth from which we
have come, You are wakan, nourishing all things, and with You we
are all relations."17
No sharp boundaries separate men and women from other
life forms (indeed, "all relations" may refer to all members of the
Oglala tribe, to all men and women, to all living beings, or to all
forms, animate and inanimate, existing in the universe). As we
16. Dr. Charles Eastman, a Santee Sioux physician on the Pine Ridge Reserva-
tion in South Dakota in the late nineteenth century, describes the creator in the
Sioux creation story as neither an anthropomorphic being nor a pantheistic princi-
ple, but as one who "remains sublimely in the background." He continues:
The Sun and the Earth, representing the male and female principles,
are the main elements in his creation.... The enkindling warmth of
the Sun entered into the bosom of our Mother, the Earth, and forth-
with she conceived and brought forth life, both vegetable and animal.
Finally there appeared mysteriously Ish-an-e-cha-ge, the First Born, a
being in the likeness of man, yet more than man, who roamed solitary
among animal people and understood their ways and language.
Walker, supra note 11, at 139. As Dr. Eastman reports the story, humans do not
first appear as one of the animals, but as their brother and sister, and in commu-
nion with them. Humans are not given dominion over the earth, but the ability to
live in harmony with its creatures.
17. Peter Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse 572 (1983).
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are all relations with the Earth Mother, rather than merely
through her, she is part of the holy life she creates. Black Elk ar-
ticulates this bond between himself and other life forms, and the
cosmic forces around him, with characteristic eloquence: "[W]hen
the thunder clouds appeared I was always glad to see them, for
they came as relatives now to visit me."' 8 Later he writes, "[Flor
now the thunder beings were like relatives to me and they had
gone away when the frost came back until the grasses show their
tender faces again."'19
In nature, Black Elk sees both spiritual signs and personal
connections. As his words about thunderclouds and frosts reveal,
nature's forces do not always keep peace with one another. Oppo-
site forces derive from a common origin, and together participate
in the earth's creative and destructive cycles.
Lakota and Dakota belief in the sacredness of the earth is the
basis for their belief in the holiness of particular places, such as
the Black Hills, which they see as the center of creation's "great
hoop." Black Elk remembers, "I saw far off the Black Hills and
the center of the world where the spirits had taken me in my great
vision."20 Standing Bear explains:
Of all our domain we loved, perhaps, the Black Hills the most.
The Lakota had named these Hills He Sapa, or Black Hills, on
account of their color. The slopes and peaks were so heavily
wooded with dark pines that from a distance the mountains ac-
tually looked black.... It was a favorite winter haunt of the
buffalo and the Lakota as well. According to a tribal legend
these hills were a reclining female figure from whose breasts
flowed life-giving forces, and to them the Lakota went as a
child to its mother's arms. 21
Thus, the Black Hills have a different meaning for the Oglala
than for the tourists visiting them each year to photograph the
white men's faces irreverently carved into Rushmore's rock. From
the Hills flow the springs of the Lakota's spiritual life, and to
them come the Lakota people, not as visitors but as children.
C. Space and Time in Judeo-Christian Traditions
Jewish and Christian traditions focus on the sacred character
of time22 in contrast to the holiness of place stressed by Lakota
18. Black Elk Speaks, supra note 1, at 180.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 230.
21. Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 43.
22. Abraham Heschel, prominent Jewish theologian and teacher, explains that:
The Bible is more concerned with time than with space. It sees the
world in the dimension of time. It pays more attention to generations,
1985]
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and Dakota religions. This is not to say that Jews and Christians
have no concept of sacred space. God's appearance to Moses on
Mount Sinai, and the Jewish people's century-old longing to return
to the Holy Land, as well as the prevalence of Christian shrines
and cathedrals throughout the world, testify to the belief that God
blesses those places where he encounters his people.23
Nonetheless, Christianity professes (and derives from Juda-
ism) the belief that history, an expression of time, rather than na-
ture, an expression of space, redeems. Theologian Paul Tillich
thus writes about "the call of Abraham, implying the demand to
separate himself from the spatial gods of his father's house and to
follow the God of time ... ."24 Liberation from the spatial gods im-
plies salvation through history. Tihich observes that in the Old
Testament "it is obvious that God reveals himself not only in his-
tory but also through history as a whole. The gods of space are
overcome; history has a beginning, a center, and an end."25
Though Tillich argues for a renewed Protestant awareness of
nature's sacramental character, he notes that "[t]heology places a
negative value-judgment upon the natural in the formal sense,
which is viewed as corrupted, sinful, and fallen, in opposition to
the supernatural, which is the redeemed, the restored, and per-
to events, than to countries, to things; it is more concerned with his-
tory than with geography....
Holiness in space, in nature, was known in other religions. New in the
teaching of Judaism was that the idea of holiness was gradually shifted
from space to time, from the realm of nature to the realm of history,
from things to events. The physical world became divested of any in-
herent sanctity. There were no naturally sacred plants or animals
anymore. To be sacred, a thing had to be consecrated by a conscious
act of man. The quality of holiness is not the grain of matter. It is a
preciousness bestowed upon things by an act of consecration and per-
sisting in relation to God.
Abraham Heschel, Between God and Man: An Interpretation of Judaism 216, 225
(1959). Rudolf Bultmann, a prominent twentieth century Christian theologian,
reveals the Christian preoccupation with history even as he describes the manner
in which Christ liberates Christians from the temporal process. The Christian sal-
vation is both profoundly historical and radically ahistorical, for "although the ad-
vent of Christ is an historical event which happened 'once' in the past, it is, at the
same time, an eternal event which occurs again and again in the soul of any Chris-
tian." Rudolf Bultmann, History and Eschatology in The Gifford Lectures 152,53
(1957).
23. Christian scholars and teachers traditionally use the masculine pronoun
when speaking of God. Several modern theologians have observed the sexist as-
sumptions behind this use. See, e.g., Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a
Philosophy of Women's Liberation (1975); Religion and Sexism: Images of Woman
in the Jewish and Christian Traditions (Rosemary Radford Ruether ed. 1974).
24. Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era 22 (James Luther Adams trans. 1957).
25. Id.
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fected." 26 This view places spirit and nature in opposition.
D. Anglo-European Religion: Spirit and Nature
in Opposition
The Anglo-European attitude toward the land its citizens
claimed to "discover" in America differs markedly from that of
Native American culture. Along with rifles, plows, and the Bible,
European colonists brought a legal tradition and cultural values
regarding private property and its ownership. They also brought
rich religious traditions, some reflecting a hostility toward the nat-
ural world and the natural in people. Jonathan Edwards, a promi-
nent eighteenth-century American theologian, wrote:
So long as men are in their natural state, they not only have
no good thing, but it is impossible they should have, or do any
good thing, as appears by Rom. 8:8. There is nothing in their
nature, as they have it by the first birth, whence should arise
any true subjection to God; as appears by Rom. 8:7. If there
were anything truly good in the flesh, or in man's nature, or
natural disposition, under a moral view, then it should be
amended; but the Scripture represents as though we were to
be enemies to it, and were to seek nothing short of its entire
destruction, as has been observed.27
Because the flesh antagonizes the spirit, and, through its insatia-
ble demands, dulls the soul's godly light, it must be mastered
rather than indulged. Similarly, the natural world, as the theater
of temptation and fall, of sin and damnation, must be subjugated
and stripped of its trappings in order that it might become the
stage for salvation's drama. Political philosopher Max Weber ob-
served the Calvinist desire to control and rationalize the natural
world:
The Calvinist was fascinated by the idea that God, in creating
the world, including the order of society, must have willed
things to be objectively purposeful as a means of adding to His
glory; not the flesh for its own sake, but the organization of
the things of the flesh under His will. The active energies of
the elect, liberated by the doctrine of predestination, thus
flowed into the struggle to rationalize the world.28
The Puritans' hostility toward nature extended to the "natu-
ral person" as well. Paul's New Testament admonition to "crucify
26. Id. at 99.
27. 3 Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards 280
(Clyde Holbrook ed. 1970).
28. Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Em-




our old man" 29 in order to become the new meant that the natives
of North America, wholly corrupt because utterly without the sav-
ing benefit of God's word, were savages, to be subjugated or anni-
hilated. John Quincy Adams wrote to John Adams, summarizing
the hopes of the new Yankees: "The whole continent of North
America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be peo-
pled by one nation, speaking one language, professing one general
system of religious and political principles, and accustomed to one
general tenor of social usages and customs." 30
Other Americans would conclude that any Indian not willing
to yield to the destiny described by Quincy Adams should be per-
suaded by any means necessary. Historian Richard Drinnon con-
cludes the Puritans "sought nothing less than to master the
masterless 'natural man,' and, for good measure, the rest of na-
ture."31 If, in the context of Christian culture, the natural was the
unredeemed part of the Christian, the natural was the whole of
the Savage. What, therefore, must be redeemed or extirpated in-
cluded native religion, language, livelihood, customs, and, if neces-
sary, native populations.32
Along with a religious hostility to the natural world, the
Europeans brought a dedication to cultural and legal concepts of
private property.33 Eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume
29. Romans 6:6.
30. Drinnon, supra note 28, at 113.
31. Id. at 31.
32. Modern American society has, to a large extent, replaced its faith in the
Calvinist God with a faith in technology's promises. It has abandoned its desire to
control nature for divine purposes, wanting now to manipulate the physical world
for its own sake, and for the material comforts and gains such manipulation yields.
Sociologist Robert Heilbroner describes how modern social systems, whether capi-
talist or socialist, subordinate human needs to industrial imperatives, and thereby
impoverish the human spirit:
For industrial civilization achieves its economic success by imposing
common values on both its capitalist and socialist variants. There is
the value of the self-evident importance of efficiency, with its ten-
dency to subordinate the optimum human scale of things to the opti-
mum technical scale. There is the value of the need to "tame" the
environment, with its consequence of an unthinking pillage of nature.
There is the value of the priority of production itself, visible in the
care both systems lavish on technical virtuosity and the indifference
with which both look upon the aesthetic aspects of life. All these val-
ues manifest themselves throughout bourgeois and "socialist" styles of
life, both lived by the clock, organized by the factory or office, ob-
sessed with material achievements, tuned to highly quantitative modes
of thought-in a word, by styles of life, that, in contrast with non-in-
dustrial civilizations, seem dazzlingly rich in every dimension except
that of the cultivation of the human person.
Robert Heilbroner, An Inquiry Into The Human Prospect 77 (1974).
33. While centuries-old in Britain and Europe, these concepts originated in the
ancient world. It is beyond this article's scope to trace that development, to thor-
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thus argues for the centrality of private property ownership to
civilization:
No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of
property, and for the stability of possession, is of all circum-
stances the most necessary to the establishment of human soci-
ety, and that after the agreement for the fixing and observing
of this rule, there remains little or nothing to be done towards
settling a perfect harmony and concord.
34
Among the problems in transposing Anglo-European prop-
erty principles to the American soil was how to dispose of the
property claims the Indians asserted. Under English common law,
one who occupied a piece of land was presumed to own it. 3 5 That
presumption, though rebuttable, was strong.36 Because the Indians
obviously occupied Americas' lands in some manner, the colonial,
and then the United States' legal system, sought to define occu-
pancy in such a way as to negate the Indians' property rights. The
new Americans did not have to fashion legal doctrines out of
whole cloth. Centuries before, English common law had recog-
nized that a litigant's "improvement" of the land helped establish
ownership of it. Improvement of the land implied appropriating
it in such a way that its natural condition was changed.3 8 Because
the Indians made few changes in the land's natural character, they
were disadvantaged by European laws.
The Indians did, however, depend on the land for their liveli-
hood and used the land in hunting, gathering, and, in some cases,
agriculture. No matter how "primitive" the European settlers
thought the Indian economy to be, they could not simply ignore
tribal property rights under the tenets of English common law.
Gradually, American jurists crafted a complex body of law which
imperfectly reconciled the government's taking of Indian lands
with the Anglo-Saxon doctrines of private property. The courts
premised this law on the assumption that white ownership of
America was both desirable and historically inevitable.
oughly outline its character, or to present the views of Europe's own critics of West-
ern property law. See generally Lawrence Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic
Foundations (1977).
34. Id. at i (quoting 3 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, part II, § II).
35. Grant Nelson & Dale Whitman, Real Estate Transfer, Finance and Develop-
ment: Cases and Materials 119-20 (1981).
36. See Becker, supra note 33, at 24-25.
37. For more current manifestation of this doctrine, see, e.g., Bradley v. Hess,
48 Or. App. 505, 617 P.2d 308 (1980); Burkhardt v. Smith, 17 Wis. 2d 132, 115 N.W.2d
540 (1962).
38. Lawrence Becker notes that by hunting the land one may also appropriate
it. Becker, supra note 33, at 27.
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II. The Expression of Difference: Land and the Law
A. Foundation Cases
Justice John Marshall's opinions in early United States
Supreme Court cases involving Native American land rights are,
like many of Marshall's decisions, the foundation of present legal
doctrine on the subject.39 In Johnson v. M'Intosh 40 the Chief Jus-
tice wrote that while the European discoverer did not automati-
cally possess American Indian lands, "discovery gave an exclusive
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by
purchase or by conquest."4 1 Marshall bluntly conceded that "[t]he
title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force. The con-
queror prescribes its limits."42 He went on to assert that
[h]owever extravagant the pretension of converting the discov-
ery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the
principle has been asserted in the first instance, and after-
wards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under
it; if the property of the great mass of the community
originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be
questioned. 43
Marshall extended the theory of Johnson v. M'Intosh in Cher-
okee Nation v. Georgia .44 In Cherokee Nation, the Marshall Court
allowed the state of Georgia to violate the terms of treaties ratified
by Congress. Beginning in 1828, the Georgia legislature passed a
39. Though Justice Marshall rejected the position of his contemporary, Andrew
Jackson, that states could rightfully ignore the autonomy of Indian nations, some of
Marshall's early decisions paved the way for the thinly disguised theft of Indian
lands. Critical as I am of Justice Marshall's opinions in the early Indian property
cases, I do not wish to misrepresent them as simplistic, or as wholly detrimental to
the Indians' property rights. Had Marshall not been a strong Chief Justice, the
tribes might have lost even more of their autonomy in the early nineteenth century
than they did. Marshall despised the crudity of Andrew Jackson's open bigotry and
genocidal intention toward the Indians and had contempt for Jackson's willful mis-
understanding of legal precedent from America's colonial period defining the polit-
ical relationship between the government and the sovereign Indian tribes.
40. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
41. Id. at 587.
42. Id. at 589.
43. Id, at 591.
44. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Cherokee Nation came before the Supreme Court
as a last and desperate attempt by the Cherokee nation to prevent its eviction from
tribal lands that had been guaranteed them by treaty, and earlier, in 1732, by char-
ter with Britain. The Indians lost their case, and were evicted in a series of forced
marches, now known as the Trail of Tears, to distant western lands. United States
soldiers and settlers "inspired" the Cherokee to leave by burning whole villages
and murdering those willing to fight or unable to flee. Few Cherokee survived the
march, which took place in the dead of winter, along uncharted paths, with few ra-
tions. Rennard Strickland, Fire and the Spirits 5, 8, 67 (1975); Grant Foreman, In-
dian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians 229-312
(1953).
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series of acts for the purpose of adding "the territory lying within
[Georgia] and occupied by the Cherokee Indians" to Georgia's vari-
ous counties, and to extend Georgia's laws into that territory.45
The Cherokee filed a claim seeking to restrain the state from for-
cibly exercising its legislative power over an independent neigh-
boring people.46
The Cherokee Nation Court faced the question of whether a
state could seize land guaranteed to the Cherokee under United
States treaty law without compensating them for the taking. The
Marshall Court declined to face the issue squarely, holding that it
could not interpose on the Cherokees' behalf given the form in
which the Indians framed their case. Marshall wrote that the
Cherokee were not asking the Court to decide the "mere question
of [their] right" to occupy the land, but were requesting that the
Supreme Court limit the autonomy of Georgia's legislature.47
Despite the Court's failure to address the issue raised by the
Cherokees' claim, Cherokee Nation's holding and dicta have be-
come the foundation of doctrine governing Indian property and tri-
bal status. Marshall's opinion articulated the concept of the
"domestic dependent nation."48 It is a difficult concept to grasp.
On the one hand, Marshall writes that the Indians have an un-
questionable right to the lands they occupy. On the other, he
states that the United States "assert[s] a title [to Indian lands] in-
dependent of [the Indians'] will," which must take effect when the
tribe's "right of possession ceases." 49 The relationship between the
government and American Indians, writes Marshall, is that of a
ward to its guardian.50 This analogy persists today. Courts con-
45. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 7.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2, 17.
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id. In contrast to Cherokee Nation is Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832), decided one year after the publication of Cherokee Nation. In Worces-
ter, the Marshall Court ruled that Georgia lacked the power to evict a white mis-
sionary from Cherokee tribal land. In Cherokee Nation, Marshall had held that
given the posture of the case, the Court lacked the authority to decide whether a
series of statutes passed by the Georgia legislature affected a transfer in the owner-
ship of tribal property from the Cherokee Nation to the State of Georgia. Cherokee
Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. In Worcester, Marshall felt that he had the case he needed
to rule upon the Cherokee's right to retain their tribal land. He held that the Act
under which Georgia prosecuted the missionary, Worcester, was "repugnant to the
Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States." Worcester, 31 U.S. at 596.
The Act, which was passed by Georgia on December 22, 1830, stated in relevant
part:
that all white persons residing within the limits of the Cherokee Na-
tion, on the first day of March next, or at anytime thereafter, without
a license or permit from his excellency the governor, or from such
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tinue to conceive of the United States government as holding tribal
property in trust for Indian tribes.
Marshall's balanced prose masks a sleight of hand, for he
takes away from the Indians everything he seems to give them.
He grants Indian nations sovereignty, but that independence is ex-
tinguishable at the United States' caprice. Notwithstanding con-
demnation of the United States' role in the historical conflicts
underlying the Cherokee Nation case, the ward and guardian doc-
trine flourishes today.51
B. The Black Hills Cases
1. Origins of conflict over the Black Hills.
In none of the United States' dealings with the American In-
dian tribes has it acted upon its professed ideals. This nation's
treatment of the Lakota and Dakota nations has been particularly
ugly.
On April 29, 1868, in the aftermath of war between the na-
agent as his excellency the governor shall authorize to grant such per-
mit or license... shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor.
Id. at 523. In so ruling, Marshall held also that Georgia had no authority to extin-
guish the boundaries of territory guaranteed to the Cherokee in its treaty with the
United States government.
The Worcester holding is somewhat inconsistent with Cherokee Nation, and
may be thought to qualify the ward and guardian relationship Cherokee Nation es-
tablishes. In Worcester, Marshall ridiculed the "extravagant and absurd idea, that
the feeble settlements made on the sea coast, or the companies under whom they
were made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people, or (to] occupy
the lands from sea to sea." 31 U.S. at 544-45. Marshall concluded:
[A] weaker power does not surrender its independence-its rights to
self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protec-
tion. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself
under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of
the right of (self] government, and ceasing to be a state.... The Cher-
okee Nation... is a distinct community occupying its own territory...
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
[C]ongress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation is by our [C]onstitution and laws, vested in the government of
the United States.
Id. at 561. President Jackson is reported to have responded to Marshall's holding in
Worcester by saying "Marshall has made his law, [now] let him enforce it." Strick-
land, supra note 44, at 8. True to his word, President Jackson refused to enforce
Marshall's injunction, and the Cherokee were driven by General Winfield Scott and
his troops from their tribal land. Id.; Joseph Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study
in Law, Politics and Morality, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500-31 (1969).
51. This doctrine appears in modified form in United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). There, the Court says Congress may both act as a
guardian for its Indian wards and acquire their property under the power of emi-
nent domain, so long as it does not do bath at the same time.
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tions, the United States concluded a treaty with the Sioux.52 Anx-
ious to open the West to white settlers and gold explorers, the
United States was eager to end its often unsuccessful battles with
the skilled Plains warriors.5 3 The treaty guaranteed the Indians
"absolute and undisturbed use of the Great Sioux Reservation,"
which included the sacred Black Hills, and stated further that
"[n]o treaty for the cessation of any portion or part of the reserva-
tion herein described... shall be of any validity or force.., unless
executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male
Indians, occupying or interested in the same." 54 In return, the In-
dians relinquished any claim to territory recognized as theirs
under an earlier treaty.55 This included all of what is now South
Dakota, and parts of Nebraska, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Mon-
tana. In addition, they agreed not to oppose the construction of a
railroad across the West and to allow construction of other roads
across the Great Sioux Reservation. 56
52. Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 4-8. The "war" which the 1868 Fort Laramie
treaty concluded was actually a series of skirmishes beginning in the early 1850's.
Troubles between the Indians and the white people began almost as soon as the
trappers and settlers moved onto the Great Plains. In 1837, a smallpox epidemic
spread by the settlers killed thousands of Plains Indians. Pioneers and gold explor-
ers, trekking across the Plains in ever greater numbers, slaughtered buffalo, ante-
lope, and deer as they went, depleting the Indians' food supply. In 1851, the Sioux
nation signed its first treaty with the United States government. The government
violated the treaty almost immediately by building fortified trading posts on the
Platte River. As the settlers' number increased so did hostilities. In 1866, Washing-
ton sent an expedition to begin opening the Bozeman Trail into Montana across the
Sioux' tribal land. Crazy Horse, a great Oglala warrior and leader, defeated a cav-
alry attachment in 1866 at Big Piney Creek on the Powder River. In the following
year, the United States Cavalry defeated the Plains warriors near the Big Horn
River, but saw no opportunity for permanent victory over the Indians. Thus, in
1868, a United States commission negotiated the Fort Laramie treaty with Red
Cloud and the Sioux nation. Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 7. For an eloquent ac-
count of the government's brutality and wars against the Plains Indians, see Dee
Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, supra note 2. Brown's sixth chapter,
"Red Cloud's War," recounts the battles concluded by the 1868 treaty.
53. Chief Spotted Tail explained to the white commission that the govern-
ment's roads, and the encroachment of settlers on tribal lands, had caused the
battles:
The Great Father has made roads stretching east and west. Those
roads are the cause of all [of] our troubles.... The country we live in
is overrun by whites. All our game is gone. This is the cause of great
trouble. I have been a friend of the whites, and am now.... If you
stop your roads we can get our game. That Powder River country be-
longs to the Sioux.... My friends, help us; take pity on us.
Brown, supra note 2, at 142.
54. Treaty of Fort Laramie (1851), quoted in Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 7.
The text of the Treaty is not published in the public laws because the assent of all
the tribes had not been obtained, and consequently the Treaty was not in proper
form for publication. See 11 Stat. 749 (1859).
55. Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 7.
56. Id.
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In the 1868 treaty, the government was willing to let the Indi-
ans keep the Black Hills. While the Lakota understood the sacred
nature of the Hills and believed them to be the source of life, the
government thought them inaccessible and of little economic
worth. Six years later, however, Colonel George Custer led an ex-
pedition into the Hills, confirming earlier rumors that they were
filled with gold. Unable or unwilling to keep the miners out, Pres-
ident Grant sent a commission from Washington to persuade the
Indians to give up the Hills. Lakota leaders Sitting Bull and Crazy
Horse rejected the government's offer of a "fair price," asserting
instead the integrity of the land and its people. "One does not sell
the land on which the people walk," Crazy Horse told the United
States negotiators.5 7
Tensions between the gold miners and the Indians continued
to mount. By 1876, more than 10,000 whites were living in Custer
City in the southern Hills.58 In late December, 1875, the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs feared that Indian hunting parties camped
outside of the reservation threatened the reservation system and
the safety of the whites invading the Hills. He therefore ordered
the Indian agents to notify all Indians living off the reservation
that unless they returned to reservation land by January 31, 1876,
the United States military would pursue them. Severe weather
and an extreme shortage of food on the reservation made the
hunters' compliance with these instructions impossible. Many of
the runners sent out from the agencies to warn the hunting parties
did not themselves return until weeks after the January 31st
deadline.59
Impossible or not, the United States declared war upon the
Indians. The government fared poorly, considering their superior
numbers and weapons, losing a decisive battle to Red Cloud and
Crazy Horse at Greasy Grass Creek (known to whites as Little Big
Horn), where Custer was killed. Soon after, however, the United
States got the upper hand, and the hostility culminated in the
bloody massacre at Wounded Knee: two hundred or more Indian
men, women and children were ambushed and slain by Custer's
former regiment.60
57. Id. at 10-11.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Brown, supra note 2, at 284-85.
60. Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 20. Matthiessen quotes Dr. Charles Eastman,
a young Santee Sioux physician on Pine Ridge who witnessed the aftermath of the
massacre:
Fully three miles from the scene of the massacre we found the body of
a woman completely covered with a blanket of snow, and from this
point on we found them scattered along as they had been relentlessly
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Meanwhile, Congress unilaterally changed the terms of the
1868 Fort Laramie treaty. In 1877, it enacted into law a treaty pro-
posed by the Manypenny Commission. 61 The treaty provided that
the Sioux nation would abandon the Black Hills and other lands
west of the 103rd meridian, as well as their right to hunt in territo-
ries to the north, in exchange for subsistence rations only for so
long as they might need them to survive.62 This alteration violated
the Fort Laramie treaty, which had stipulated that its terms could
not be changed unless three-fourths of the adult male Sioux popu-
lation agreed to the change. Fewer than ten percent of that popu-
lation had signed the "agreement" proposed by the Manypenny
Commission. Regardless, Congress enacted the "agreement" into
law in 1877.63 Despite its illegality, the new "treaty" marked the
final loss of the Black Hills by the Sioux Nation.
2. The Sioux Nation case.
a. Legal history.
The Dakota and Lakota nations have continued to assert
their right to live in the Hills from 1877 until today. In 1923, the
tribes filed a petition with the court of claims alleging that the
United States, in violation of the fifth amendment, had taken the
Hills from them without rendering just compensation.64 Nothing
of substance happened in the case until 1942 when the court dis-
missed the claim.6 5 The claims court unanimously held it had no
authority to determine whether Congress had offered the Sioux an
adequate price, and that "the Sioux' claim was a moral one not
hunted down and slaughtered while fleeing for their lives. Some of
our people discovered relatives or friends among the dead, and there
was much wailing and mourning. When we reached the spot where
the Indian camp had stood, among the fragments of burned tents and
other belongings we saw the frozen bodies lying close together or piled
one upon another. I counted eighty bodies of men who had been in
council and who were almost as helpless as the women and babes
when the deadly fire began, for nearly all their guns had been taken
from them .... All this was a severe ordeal for one who had so lately
put his faith in the Christian love and lofty ideals of the white man.
Id.
61. 19 Stat. 254 (1877).
62. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 381 (1980); Matthies-
sen, supra note 17, at 13.
63. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1980); Mat-
thiessen, supra note 17, at 12-13.
64. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 384 (1980) (citing
Sioux Tribe v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613, 658 (1942), cert denied, 318 U.S. 789
(1943)). The tribes filed their petition under a special jurisdictional act providing
them a forum for adjudicating all claims against the United States arising under
treaty law (Act of June 3, 1920, ch. 222, 41 Stat. 738).
65. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613 (1942).
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protected by the Just Compensation Clause." 66 Not at issue before
the claims court was the question of whether any money sum
could justify the United States' theft.
In 1946, Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission
Act,67 creating a new forum to hear tribal grievances against the
government. The Sioux resubmitted their claim to the commis-
sion, and lost again. The tribe returned to the court of claims, fil-
ing a motion to vacate its affirmance of the Commission,
contending the record was inadequate. This time, the court
agreed.68
Not until 1974 did the plaintiffs overcome the last procedural
obstacle and obtain a hearing on the substance of their compensa-
tion claim. By this time, the birth of the American Indian Move-
ment, and the affirmation of traditional values, caused many tribes
to reconsider their participation in the lawsuit. Equating land with
money was never a Plains Indians value. The white culture's ruth-
less efforts over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to displace
those traditional values, including the allotment acts,69 the contin-
ued theft of treaty lands,70 and the termination policies of the
1950's,71 however, had convinced many Indians that trying to col-
66. Id. at 658. The court here refers to the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution.
67. Ch. 959, § 1, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1982)).
68. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 385 (1980)
(Court's statement of case history).
69. The General Allotment Act or Dawes Act of 1887, amended in 1891 and
1910, authorized the President to divide tribally-held lands into plots "not to exceed
eighty acres of agricultural or one hundred and sixty acres of grazing land" when-
ever it was, in his opinion, advantageous for the Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1982). In
the original act, each head of a family would be assigned a plot, each single person
and orphan child was assigned one-eighth of a section, and the rest of the land was
sold off as "surplus." Vine Deloria explains that the government thought "that the
routine work of agriculture would provide the necessary training in thrifty habits
that all 'civilized' peoples possessed." Vine Deloria & Clifford Lytle, American In-
dians, American Justice 9-10 (1983). The government also hoped the Indians would
learn the virtues of capitalism. "As a consequence of the allotment policy," writes
Deloria, "Indian landholdings were reduced from 138 million acres in 1877 to 48
million in 1934. Of this 48 million acres, nearly 20 million were desert or semiarid
and virtually useless for any kind of annual farming ventures." Id. at 10.
70. The government accomplished this theft in various ways. In part, it did so
through its allotment acts, see Deloria & Lytle, supra note 69, its treaty violations,
see supra text accompanying notes 52-63, and its termination policies, infra note 71.
71. During the 1950's, Congress passed a body of confusing and inconsistent leg-
islation whose purpose was to end the federal supervision of Indian tribes and to
eliminate tribal dependence upon the United States government. Proponents of the
termination policies hoped Indians, once freed from governmental supervision and
financial assistance, would become assimilated into the dominant culture. To that
end, Congress passed Resolution 108 (H. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953)), which
declared that it was "the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of
the Indian tribes and the individual members thereof located within the states of
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lect money for their loss of land was the best strategy available to
them. Furthermore, litigating for money damages in a system
predicated on the assumption that everything has a monetary
equivalent may be the only form of justice available. American In-
dian scholar Vine Deloria, commenting on the lawsuit, observed:
The purpose of the suit was to regain as much of the sacred
land as possible and a money award, while distasteful, is still a
means to that goal. Per capita distribution and the subsequent
expenditure of over $100 million on consumer goods, however,
would be a clear signal that the Sioux people have adopted the
white man's wasteful ways.7 2
Despite the monetary remedial structure of the United
States' legal system, and despite logical arguments in favor of su-
ing for money, many tribes declined to participate in the lawsuit.
Black Elk's Oglala Tribe, the largest of the Sioux bands, has, along
with many other tribes, refused to accept the money eventually
awarded to the tribes, just as the Oglala had earlier tried to disso-
ciate itself from the lawsuit.73
b. The Sioux Nation holding.
In theory, and in cosmetic appearance, the Sioux nation won
its compensation suit against the government. Over the dissent of
conservative colleagues, the United States Court of Claims and
Supreme Court affirmed the Indian Claims Commission's holding
that the government's 1877 acquisition of the Black Hills consti-
tuted an unjust taking under the fifth amendment. The Sioux Na-
tion was awarded substantial compensation. In practice, however,
the legal theory of the case is dangerous precedent against Indian
litigants. In holding for the Sioux nation, the Supreme Court ap-
plied legal doctrines and precedents whose premises are hostile to
California, Florida, New York and Texas ... should be freed from Federal supervi-
sion and control." Deloria & Lytle, supra note 69, at 17-18. Congress transformed
that resolution into law by passing a number of acts which curtailed tribal author-
ity, reduced federal assistance to the tribes, and phased some tribes out of exist-
ence. By 1958, many government officials realized that the policy had failed, and
Secretary of the Interior Seaton announced that hereinafter, no tribe would be ter-
minated without its consent. In 1970, President Nixon renounced termination as
morally and legally unacceptable. Deloria & Lytle, supra note 69, at 15-21.
72. Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 606 (quoting Vine Deloria, Jr., in the L.A.
Times, June 25, 1980).
73. In Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, 650 F.2d 140 (D.S.D. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982), the Oglala tribe sought restoration of the Black Hills af-
ter the Supreme Court, in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371
(1980), awarded them money damages for the government's illegal taking of the
Hills in 1877. The tribe justified their demand for the land itself on the basis that




the deepest convictions of the Lakota and Dakota people. The de-
cision has effectively barred almost every subsequent property
rights and religious freedom claim brought by the Black Hills
People. 74
In awarding a victory to the Sioux, the Indian Claims Com-
mission assessed the fair market value of the lands taken from
them at $17,533,484.75 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the gov-
ernment challenged only portions of the Commission's ruling re-
quiring payment of interest on that sum from the date of the
taking until the Commission's decision. The government would
owe interest only if its acquisition constituted a taking in violation
of the fifth amendment. In concluding such a violation had taken
place, the Supreme Court relied on the reasoning of a lower fed-
eral court decision, Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States. 76
Fort Berthold held:
Where Congress makes a good faith effort to give the Indians
the full value of the land and thus merely transmutes the
property from land to money, there is no taking. This is a
mere substitution of assets or change of form and is a tradi-
tional function of a trustee. 77
The Fort Berthold rationale contains implicit assumptions hostile
to the Indian position. It equates land with money and derives
from Cherokee Nation's paternalistic establishment of the govern-
ment as a trustee for its Indian wards. The Fort Berthold Court
states it will not find against Congress unless the tribe "can show
that moneys received from the sale of lands were so far below the
fair market value as to amount to fraudulent conduct or gross neg-
ligence."7 Under Fort Berthold, a court does not ask whether
Congress has a right to seize Indian land, but whether it did so in
the appropriate manner.79 Adequate money compensation for the
loss of land is presumed possible.
The adoption of Fort Berthold in Sioux Nation injures Indian
interests. First, the decision perpetuates the assumption that Con-
74. Justice Brandeis' oft-quoted observation seems applicable: "Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's
purposes are beneficient.... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
75. Sioux Nation v. United States, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 151, 362-63 (1974).
76. 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1968), affd, 204 Ct. Cl. 831 (1974).
77. Id. at 691.
78. Id. at 694.
79. 390 F.2d at 691. In Fort Berthold, the lower court sought to mitigate the ef-
fects of an earlier Supreme Court decision, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903), without directly refuting its underlying premises.
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gress acts justly when it exchanges sacred tribal land for money.8 0
Second, Sioux Nation implicitly affirms an earlier precedent, Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock 81, relied on in Fort Berthold .82 Lone Wolf held
Congress has absolute authority to dispose of Indian lands as its
sees fit, regardless of the provisions in treaties made with Indian
tribes.8 3 Sioux Nation concludes the effect of Lone Wolf is to
grant Congress a good faith presumption in its taking of Indian
lands.8 4 To prove an unjust taking under the fifth amendment,
Sioux Nation therefore requires Indian litigants must show not
only an unjust result, but also Congress' bad intent.8 5 To its credit,
80. 448 U.S. at 416.
81. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Like the Congressional Act of 1877 abolishing the terms
of the Fort Laramie treaty, Lone Wolf arose when Congress enacted into law an
"agreement" abolishing the terms of a treaty, which agreement the requisite
number of Indians had failed to sign.
82. 390 F.2d at 691-92.
83. 187 U.S. at 567-68. The Lone Wolf decision marked a bitter day for Ameri-
can Indians. In it, the Supreme Court went further than Cherokee Nation, holding
that
Congress possess[es] a paramount power over the property of the Indi-
ans, by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests....
Plenary authority over tribal relations of the Indians has been exer-
cised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial de-
partment of the government.
Id. at 565. The Court thus ruled that the judiciary has no right to inquire into the
adequacy of the compensation afforded to the Indians, and that it "must presume
that Congress acted in perfect good faith in [its] dealings with the Indians." Id. at
568. "In any event," the Court continued, "as Congress possessed full power in the
matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted
the enactment of this legislation." Id.
84. Sioux Nation derives this interpretation from Fort Berthold. The Fort Ber-
thold court distilled from Lone Wolf a distinction that the opinion arguably does
not make: that so long as Congress purports to act in good faith, the courts cannot
inquire into its real motives or the effect of its actions, but if Congress does not so
purport, or if an act's legislative history belies Congress' good-faith claim, then the
courts may find that Congress unjustly took Indian tribal land. The Fort Berthold
court reached that interpretation by distinguishing between two kinds of congres-
sional function: fiduciary authority and obligation as a trustee contrasted with the
sovereign power of eminent domain. Judge Collins wrote:
It is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneously (1) act as trustee for
the benefit of the Indians, exercising its plenary powers over the Indi-
ans and their property, as it thinks is in their best interests, and (2)
exercise its sovereign power of eminent domain, taking the Indians'
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion. In any given situation in which Congress has acted with regard
to the Indian people, it must have acted either in one capacity or the
other. Congress can own two hats, but it cannot wear them both at
the same time.
Fort Berthold, 390 F.2d at 691. Where Congress does not purport to give the tribe
adequate consideration for a taking of land, it exercises its power as sovereign;
where it does purport, it acts as trustee. In either case, it confiscates Indian land.
85. The Sioux Nation Court criticized, but did not overturn Lone Wolf, holding
instead that the case was inapplicable for two reasons: 1) In Lone Wolf, Congress
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the Sioux Nation Court writes that it must examine the complete
factual and historical record to determine whether "a particular
measure was appropriate for protecting and advancing the tribe's
interests."86 As applied to the 1877 taking of treaty lands, the
Sioux Nation Court determined that Congress had acted with bad
intent because it had never intended to compensate the Indians.8 7
Therefore, the acquisition of Sioux lands constituted a taking in vi-
olation of the fifth amendment.
By failing to expressly overrule Lone Wolf, Sioux Nation
leaves jurists like Judge Bennett, who dissented against the court
of claims opinion the Supreme Court affirmed, free to argue that
"[t]he sense of the [Lone WoU] opinion seems to be that Indian tri-
bal property is simply not protected by the fifth amendment."8 8
However objectionable the assumption behind this dissent, it
seems a more accurate reading of Lone Wolf than that of either
the majority court of claims or the Supreme Court opinion in
Sioux Nation. Judge Bennett wrote:
It may be that the thought then was that due process protects
only 'persons' and 'private property' and that Indian tribes
were not 'persons,' and Indian tribal property, owned com-
munally, was not private property.... What the majority fails
to consider is that Lone Wolf held that it was within Congress'
set aside money for the "surplus" lands it seized from the unwilling Indians, but did
not in the case before the Court, 448 U.S. at 412-14, and 2) Lone Wolf's "presump-
tion of congressional good faith ha[d] little to recommend it as an enduring princi-
ple" for deciding whether Congress acted fairly. Id. at 414.
In refusing to overrule Lone Wolf, however, the Sioux Nation Court assigns to
the persecuted minority the burden of proving Congress' discriminatory intent. As
Judge Nichols notes in an astute concurrence to the claims court's decision in Sioux
Nation v. United States:
Lone Wolf did undoubtedly say that when Congress 'purported' to
give an adequate consideration in any exchange, it was not permissible
to go behind its fact finding to ask if the consideration was really ade-
quate, nor could the Court inquire into the evil motives that might be
lurking in Congressional breasts.
601 F.2d at 1174. Nichols concludes: "The meaning of Lone Wolf and of O'Brien is
that if the Congress spreads evidence on the public record, i.e. 'purports' to act in a
fair and constitutional manner, this may not be refuted by unsupported inference,
by gossip, or by hearsay." Id. at 1175.
Nothing in Sioux Nation seriously impairs Congress' ability to cover its tracks
by spreading evidence on the public record about its good intent. Under this hold-
ing, the Court will not presume Congress' good faith, but it also refuses to inquire
into the effect a congressional act has on an Indian tribe: "We do not mean to imply
that a reviewing court is to second-guess, from the perspective of hindsight, a legis-
lative judgment that a particular measure would serve the best interests of the
tribe." 448 U.S. at 415. Historically, sums awarded in exchange for tribal lands ap-
pear pitifully small and calculated either to deceive the tribe about the govern-
ment's real intent, or to mask the capricious exercise of governmental power.
86. 448 U.S. at 415.
87. Id. at 417-21.
88. Sioux Nation, 601 F.2d at 1177 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
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constitutional power to dispose of tribal property without re-
gard to good faith or the amount of compensation.8 9
Justice Rehnquist, the lone Supreme Court dissenter in the
Sioux Nation affirmance, endorses Judge Bennett's interpretation
of the law. Rehnquist agrees that the Court must find against the
Indians if Congress makes any pretense whatsoever of compensat-
ing them. In Rehnquist's opinion, Congress' unilateral decision to
exchange the Sioux nation's sacred land, replete with game, for
subsistence rations, constituted no injustice: "As the dissenting
judges in the Court of Claims opinion under review pointedly
state: 'The majority's view that the rations were not consideration
for the Black Hills is untenable. What else was the money
for?' "90
3. The Oglala Sioux and Homestake Mining.
a. Oglala I.
The Sioux Nation case has influenced all subsequent Black
Hills' litigation. Under the res judicata doctrine, Sioux Nation has
repeatedly barred claims of various tribes to live and worship in
the Hills free from the harassment of encroaching "progress."
The mining industry, of increasing economic importance since
the Gold Rush of the 1870's, and the tourist industry have over-
taken the Hills. From the government's perspective, the Indians'
89. Id. at 1177-78.
90. 448 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Sioux Nation, 601 F.2d at
1183). Although Justice Rehnquist bases his dissent upon the claim that the 1942
Court's decision denying additional monetary damages is res judicata, he goes on to
address the merits of the Sioux nation's position. The subsistence rations, he con-
cludes, were consideration enough for the Hills. Rehnquist argues that the major-
ity rejects that conclusion, largely on the basis of revisionist history.
There were undoubtedly greed, cupidity, and other less-than-admira-
ble tactics employed by the Government during the Black Hills epi-
sode in the settlement of the West, but the Indians did not lack their
share of villainy either. It seems to me quite unfair to judge by the
light of "revisionist" historians or the mores of another era actions
that were taken under pressure of time more than a century ago.
448 U.S. at 435. Such historians, Rehnquist thinks, perpetuate a one-sided and ster-
eotyped view of how the Black Hills changed hands. In any event, Rehnquist
quotes with approval historians of his own, who, while less "revisionist," present
stereotypes of another sort:
The Plains Indians seldom practiced agriculture or other primitive
arts, but they were fine physical specimens .... They lived only for the
day, recognized no rights of property, robbed or killed anyone if they
thought they could get away with it, inflicted cruelty without a qualm,
and endured torture without flinching.
Id. at 436-37 (quoting S. Morrison, The Oxford History of the American People 539-
40 (1965)). At other points, Rehnquist argues that the Indian's "primitive" way of
life inevitably yielded to the "march of progress." Id. at 436 (quoting R. Billington,
Soldier and Brave xiii-xiv (1963)).
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refusal to coexist with mining and tourists is unreasonable. To the
Black Hills people, however, any defacement or plundering of
Paha Sapa defiles creation's center, and insults both the Earth
Mother and the Great Spirit. Motivated by these concerns, the
Oglala tribe filed an action eighteen days after the Supreme Court
published its Sioux Nation decision. The tribe alleged that in 1877
the United States had unconstitutionally exercised its power of
eminent domain. The complaint stated the taking of tribal land
was for a private rather than a public purpose, as miners reaped
the profit of the government's treaty violation. The Oglala sought
the restoration of the tribe's territorial rights to the Hills and
money damages for waste and the removal of minerals. Finally,
they moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the
United States from paying members of the tribe any part of the
money award granted by the Sioux Nation decision.91
In its brief, the Oglala tribe emphasized that counsel for the
Sioux nation did not receive authority to appeal on the Oglala
tribe's behalf, and, therefore, the decision in Sioux Nation should
not apply to them.92 The federal court held against the Oglala,
concluding "that Congress has deprived the district court of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction by expressly providing an exclusive rem-
edy for the alleged wrongful taking through the enactment of the
Indian Claims Commission Act."93 Because the Sioux nation had,
without the consent of its largest tribe gained a remedy through
the Commission, the Oglala's claim was barred.94
91. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, 650 F.2d 140, 142 (D.S.D. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) (Oglala I).
92. 650 F.2d at 142 n.6.
93. Id. at 142.
94. Senator William Bradley of New Jersey introduced a bill before the United
States Senate on July 17, 1985, which would re-establish a portion of the Great
Sioux Reservation, as defined in the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. The proposed act is
known as the "Sioux Nation Black Hills Act." S. 1453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
The re-established reservation would include, with some exceptions, federally-held
lands extending from the South Dakota-Nebraska border to a few miles north of
the North Dakota-South Dakota border. It would run east from the 104 to the 103
degree of longitude west from Greenwich, except where the 103 meridian intercepts
the Cheyenne River's north fork. The reservation would follow the river down-
stream to its junction with the river's south fork and then up the south fork until it
intersects the 103 meridian. It would include the Black Hills area. S. 1453, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1985).
All of the land in the re-established area now held by the United States Park
Service would become known as the Sioux Park, and would remain "equally acces-
sible to all persons, both Sioux and non-Sioux." Id. § 11(a). In addition, lands
within the Sioux Park which the Indians identify as "traditional religious or cere-
monial sites" would be "excluded from public access to the extent necessary to pre-
serve their primary religious uses and integrity." Id. § 11(b). Further, "any lands
within the Sioux Park that are designated by the Sioux as a wildlife and wilderness
sanctuary for living things which have a special sacred relationship to the Sioux
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b. Oglala II.
The Oglala tribe next brought an action against Homestake
Mining Company to quiet title to five acres in the Hills. The tribe
sought to enjoin the company from carrying out its operations, and
to recover damages for the company's continuing trespass on
Oglala land for 106 years.95 Again, the tribe lost. The federal dis-
trict court held that Oglala I had disposed of the issues raised in
this case. It noted that in Oglala I, the tribe had sought to quiet
title to the Black Hills and to enjoin the United States and Home-
stake Mining from removing minerals from the Hills. In the pres-
ent action, the tribe wished to quiet title to the acreage
surrounding the mine, and to enjoin Homestake from interfering
with the mine. The tribe continued to maintain that Congress un-
constitutionally exercised its power of eminent domain in 1877,
and, therefore, no private party could acquire title to the Black
Hills from the United States. The tribe further insisted that since
Manuel and Harney, the founders of Homestake Mining, had en-
tered the Hills illegally prior to the 1877 Act, Oglala I, which ad-
dressed only the Act itself, was not res judicata.
The court rejected the latter argument, relying on a nine-
teenth-century case 96 that held the enactment of the 1877 Act vali-
dated the mining claims as of the date of enactment. The
constitutional argument, said the Oglala II court, had been re-
solved in Oglala I, and was, therefore, res judicata97 . Although
Sioux Nation held that the 1877 taking violated the fifth amend-
ment, it had provided an exclusive remedy in the form of mone-
may be excluded from public access to the extent necessary to provide sanctuary."
Id. § 11(c). Finally, the Act instructs the federal government to acquire, and then
relinquish to the Sioux Nation, the state-owned lands at Bear Butte. Id. § 9(b).
Privately held lands within the re-established area would not be disturbed. Id.
§ 8(a). The Sioux Nation is, however, granted a right of first refusal to purchase
those privately held lands if the owner should decide to sell. Id. § 8(b).
The funds appropriated for the Sioux by Congress in response to the Sioux Na-
tion holding would be paid to the Indians "in compensation for the loss of use of its
lands from 1877 to the effective date of [the Sioux Nation Black Hills] Act." Id.
§ 10(a).
The Sioux Nation Black Hills Act would translate into law the meaning of the
Sioux Nation's relationship to the land. It explicitly recognizes the sacred meaning
the Hills have for the Lakota and Dakota people. It recognizes also the inadequacy
of a money award to compensate the Indian people, either for the Hills themselves
or for the loss of their religious freedom as guaranteed by the first amendment Id.
§ 2(8), (9), (10). Those interested in helping the American Indian struggle for polit-
ical and religious freedom should work to secure the Act's passage.
95. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407 (D.S.D. 1983)
(Oglala 11).
96. Noonan v. Caledonia Goldmining Co., 121 U.S. 393 (1887).




Neither Oglala I or II addressed the issue of real importance
to the Oglala. No spiritual or cultural argument the tribe could
advance concerning its true feelings about the Hills, or its funda-
mental right to live and worship in them, would have legal rele-
vance in United States courts. Instead, Indian litigants must argue
foreign laws in their conqueror's courts, framing their spiritual
claim within the legal language of the conqueror. It is not surpris-
ing that under such circumstances and against such odds, the Indi-
ans lose. One might wonder how well the United States
government would fare if it were trying to litigate its claims in the
tribunals of the Hills' original inhabitants. "The government is al-
ways making laws, so many laws, every day new laws," laments
Oglala Chief Frank Fools Crow. "Then they break every one.
They use the law to cheat people, but that is not the Indian way.
We have one law, God's law: to live on this earth with respect for
all living things, and to be happy with what God has given to us."99
However sound the res judicata arguments upon which the
Oglala I and Oglala II courts based their decisions, and however
important res judicata principles may be for the stability of our
legal system, do Oglala I and Oglala I show respect for all living
things in Paha Sapa? If judges hold that such questions have no
legal relevance, they confess indifference to the achievement of
justice, no matter how often they profess concern for its fulfill-
ment in their opinions.
4. Religious freedom cases.
a. Indian perspectives on religious freedom.
At issue in each of the cases so far discussed, and implicit in
Frank Fool Crow's contrast of the dominant culture's positivist
law with the natural lawO his people follow, is the meaning of
religious freedom for Native Americans. By forcing Indians to iso-
late their property rights from their religious beliefs, our judiciary
compels them to frame their arguments in a context antagonistic
to their world-view.101 For the Lakota and Dakota peoples, reli-
98. Id. at 1413.
99. Quoted in Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 529.
100. "Natural law" is law that accords with the purposes of God, or the Creator,
and also with humanity's innate morality. "Positive law" is law enacted by legisla-
tive bodies. See Black's Law Dictionary 925, 1046 (5th ed. 1979).
101. Because Native Americans believe that people are in a relationship of unity
with the life around them, a peoples' right to live on the land is determined by its
connection with and understanding of the land, and of the life it supports. Vine
Deloria explains that for the Indian:
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gious liberty and property rights are inseparable. Government
deprivation of sacred land is government restriction of religious
freedom.
In theory, the United States affords all its citizens religious
freedom under the first amendment. Because religious persecu-
tion drove many of Europe's great dissenters to America's shores,
this nation has long recognized its citizens' right to practice their
religions free from state coercion. From the time Europeans ar-
rived in America, however, American Indian religious practices
threatened the new immigrants' expansionist aspirations. Despite
the dominant perspective of many historians, history still records
many examples of the United States' oppression of Indian religious
practices. 102
[t]o exist in a creation means that living is more than tolerance for
other life forms, it is recognition that in differences there is the
strength of creation. . . . Tribal religions find a great affinity among
species of living creatures, and it is at this point that the brotherhood
of life is a strong part of the Indian way. The Hopi, for example, re-
vere not only the lands on which they live but the animals with which
they have a particular relationship. The dance for rain, which involves
the use of reptiles in its ceremonies, holds a great fascination for
whites, primarily because they have considered reptiles ... as their
mortal enemy.
Vine Deloria, God is Red 103 (1973).
102. The government suppressed the religious practices of Indian tribes through-
out the Americas. Its suppression of Lakota and Dakota religious practices in-
cluded legislation against and policies designed to hinder many of the Dakotas'
most sacred rites. In the 1890's, the United States passed laws prohibiting the Sioux
Indians from conducting their ceremonies for the Keeping of the Souls, and even
required that on a certain day of the year, all of the souls kept by the Sioux be
released. See Black Elk, supra note 13, at 10 n.1. In 1881, the Sioux' most powerful
rite, the Sun Dance, was forbidden on all Sioux reservations. Because the Sun
Dance requires that the participants' flesh be pierced, missionaries sent to the ras-
ervations decried it as "cruel" and "sadistic." See Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 17.
As late as 1975, the Sun Dance was again outlawed, this time by tribal chairman
Dick Wilson, an anti-traditionalist backed by the United States government. See
Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 129-51.
Many of the government's policies repressing Sioux' religious practices are dif-
ficult to document. Indian agents often subtly pressured Indians to abandon their
rites. Rarely did this influence become articulated as official law or policy. A letter
sent from the Department of the Interior to the superintendents of Indian reserva-
tions, however, provides one example. This letter was distributed among the Indi-
ans and typifies the policies government agencies advocated:
To All Indians:
Not long ago I held a meeting of Superintendents, Missionaries
and Indians, at which the feeling of those present was strong against
Indian dances....
No good comes from your "give-away" custom at dances and it should
be stopped. It is not right to torture your bodies or to handle poison-
ous snakes in your ceremonies. All such extreme things are wrong
and should be put aside and forgotten. You do yourselves and your
Law and Inequality
b. First amendment free exercise claims: the Yoder
standard.
Because the Black Hills hold deep religious meaning for the
Lakota and Dakota people, they have brought legal claims under
the first amendment arguing that they are constitutionally entitled
to be restored to their relationship with the Hills. These claims
have been joined by the lawsuits brought by other American Indi-
ans under the first amendment.
Most typically, the Indian litigants are plaintiffs seeking a
court injunction against the development of sacred land.103 The
land in question usually belonged to the Indian tribe before the
European invasion, but has since been confiscated by the govern-
ment and held as public land.104 The defendants are usually gov-
ernmental departments and agencies who have ordered the
development, or who have granted a private developer the permits
necessary to change the land's natural character. 105 The plaintiff
tribes often join the private developers as defendants.1 0 6
families great injustice when at dances you give away money or other
property....
I urge you to come to an understanding and an agreement with your
Superintendent to hold no gatherings in the months when the seed-
time, cultivation of crops and the harvest need your attention, and at
other times to meet for only a short period and to have no drugs, in-
toxicants, or gambling, and no dancing that the Superintendent does
not approve.
If at the end of one year the reports which I receive show that you
are doing as requested, I shall be very glad for I will know that you
are making progress in other and more important ways, but if the re-
ports show that you reject this plea, then some other course will have
to be taken.
February 24, 1923 Sincerely yours,
(signed) CHAS. H. BURKE
Commissioner
United States Interior Dep't Circular No. 1665, Indian Dancing, April 26, 1921.
103. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 371
(1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 739 (1984); New Mexico Navajo Ranchers v. ICC, 702
F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp.
785 (D.S.D. 1982), affd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983); Inupiat Community v. United
States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), affd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984).
104. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. Tennes-
see Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Crow v. Gullett, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
105. See cases cited supra note 103.
106. See, e.g., New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v. I.C.C., 702 F.2d 227, 228
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 184 (D.
Alaska 1982).
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The federal courts deciding these cases have created a pattern
of case law centered around the Supreme Court's decision of Wis-
consin v. Yoder.107 In Yoder, the Supreme Court held the Amish
were not required to comply with Wisconsin's compulsory school
attendance law because the law conflicted with their religious be-
liefs. The Court held Amish compliance with the law would vio-
late their rights under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. 0 8 Amish parents were allowed to take their children
out of school once those children had completed the eighth grade.
The Yoder Court found: 1) the Amish had proved Wisconsin's
compulsory attendance law burdened their religious practices; and
2) the state's interest in extending the benefit of secondary educa-
tion to all children was not sufficiently compelling to justify the
burden it placed on the beliefs of the Amish people.1 0 9
Ironically, federal courts generally use Yoder to hold against
Indian religious freedom claims.110 Scrutinizing the approaches
these courts take shows how legal precedent is construed against
American Indians in order to promote the dominant culture's con-
ceptions of private property and religion.
While Indian litigants' lack of legal title to the land they wish
to protect does not bar their action under the first amendment, it
lowers the weight federal courts give to their claims."' Under
Yoder's standards, the court considering a free exercise claim first
decides whether the government's practices burden the exercise of
the plaintiffs' religion. 112 If such a burden is found, the govern-
ment action in question violates the free exercise clause unless the
government can prove an interest of "sufficient magnitude to over-
ride the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause.""13
Courts have found against Indian litigants under each of the
two prongs of the Yoder test. Where the governmental action the
107. 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
108. Id. at 215-19, 229-34.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp.
785 (D.S.D. 1982); Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska
1982). In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586
(N.D. Cal. 1983), the court used Wisconsin v. Yoder to rule in the Indians' favor.
111. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. Ten-
nessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980); Inupiat Community v. Ten-
nessee Valley Auth., 548 F. Supp. 182, 187-88 (D. Alaska 1982).
112. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980); Inupiat Commu-
nity v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188 (D. Alaska 1982).
113. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176-77 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Yoder,
406 U.S. at 214).
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Indians seek to enjoin is arguably compelling, courts tend to find
against the Indians on that ground.114 Thus, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled the government's in-
terest in maintaining the Glen Canyon dam and reservoir on the
Colorado River in southern Utah outweighed the religious interest
of the Indian plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had sought to prevent the
flooding of a 160-acre tract of land vital to their religious beliefs
and practices.11 5 In Inupiat v. United States,116 a federal district
court held the government's interest in opening an area lying from
three to sixty-five miles offshore in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas
to development and oil exploration outweighed the Inupiat peo-
ple's religious interest in the area.
In cases where the government's purpose seems less compel-
ling, courts have ruled against Indians on the grounds that their
religious freedom is not burdened. In Wilson v. Block ,117 the ap-
peals court held the government's decision to permit private entre-
preneurs to build a ski slope on certain hills in the San Francisco
Peaks considered sacred by the Navajo and Hopi Indian tribes did
not burden the Indians' religious freedom.XX8
The Wilson court reached this result through a curious anal-
ysis. The court acknowledged the Peaks play an important role in
the religious life of the Navajo and Hopi peoples.119 Nonetheless,
it held the ski slope's development would not burden the Indians'
religious beliefs or practices. i 20 The court drew a distinction be-
tween "offending" and "penalizing" adherence to religious be-
lief.121 The government may offend religious belief, but it may not
penalize it. In order to penalize religious belief, the government
must either exact a penalty for religious conduct, or condition the
receipt of a government benefit on conduct inconsistent with the
recipient's religious beliefs.122 If the government so penalizes reli-
gious belief or conduct, its action violates the free exercise clause.
In finding no such penalty, the Wilson court either ignored or dis-
missed the plaintiffs' testimony that the ski slope's construction
would penalize their religion, and would lead eventually to the de-
114. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gullet,
541 F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D. 1982); Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F.
Supp. 182, 189 (D. Alaska 1982).
115. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
116. 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982).
117. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
118. Id. at 742, 744-45.
119. Id. at 740.
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struction of religious practices upon which their present way of
life and their culture depend.123
The Wilson court, along with other federal courts ruling on
Indians' attempts to protect land under the first amendment, re-
quired the plaintiffs to prove not only that the land in question is
central to their religious beliefs, but that it is "indispensable" to
them.1 24 Yoder imposes no such requirement, but merely requires
that a religious group prove the government action violates a tenet
"central" to its religion.125 The difficulty of proving "indispens-
ability" is enormous. Proof that the land forms the basis of Indian
religious life, and has done so for centuries, does not satisfy even
this first prong of the Yoder test as it is applied to Indian cases.
In addition, courts make subtle and ethnocentric distinctions
between Indian culture and Indian religion in order to deny the
Indians the injunctive relief they seek.126 Thus, in Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Authority ,127 the Sixth Circuit wrote:
the overwhelming concern of the [Cherokee] affiants appears
to be related to the historical beginnings of the Cherokees and
their cultural development. It is damage to tribal family folk-
lore and traditions, more than particular religious observances,
which appears to be at stake.... [C]ultural history and tradi-
tion . . . are not interests protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. 128
The plaintiffs in Sequoyah had, in fact, shown that they wor-
shipped in the valley the government wished to flood, that the val-
ley was a place of religious pilgrimage, and that it was a source of
healing herbs and medicines used to effect spiritual as well as bio-
logical cures.' 29 Nonetheless, the court reached its decision by im-
posing a division between the Indians' "religion" and their
"culture."130 Such a division contradicts the plaintiffs' testimony
about how they understand their own religion. Thus, the Yoder
test, when applied to Indian plaintiffs seeking to protect sacred
land, is applied more stringently.' 3 '
123. Id. at 740, 741. As the case was presented as one for summary judgment,
the court was obliged to consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, the Indian plaintiff.
124. Id. at 744.
125. 406 U.S. at 213-15.
126. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1983); South Dakota v.
Brave Heart, 326 N.W.2d 220, 223 (S.D. 1982).
127. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). Sequoyah holds that the flooding of a valley
sacred to the Cherokee did not violate the Cherokee's first amendment rights
under the free exercise clause.
128. Id. at 1164-65.
129. Id. at 1164-65.
130. Id at 1162, 1164.
131. The Amish, as well as the plaintiffs in Sequoyah, Wilson, and Badoni, al-
1985]
Law and Inequality
c. American Indian Religious Freedoms Act.
The unique relationship between religion and land in Ameri-
can Indian cultures may mean that Indians require a unique cause
of action protecting their religious freedom and access to sacred
lands. Historically, however, United States policy has been to up-
root rather than to nurture that relationship.132 Thus, little legis-
lation protecting Indian religious freedom was passed until 1978.
In response to the Civil Rights Movement and the success of the
American Indian Movement and similar organizations, Congress
passed the American Indian Religious Freedoms Act (AIRFA).133
leged the government's action threatened to undermine their religious beliefs. Can
these cases be reconciled? Is public school education of Amish children between
the ages of 14 and 16 more burdensome upon Amish religious freedom than forever
depriving an Indian tribe of land that forms the basis for its religion? Is the right
to educate one's children in the Amish faith somehow more "religious" and less
"cultural" than Indians' right to visit the graves of their ancestors, and to gather
sacred herbs at the place where they have for centuries gathered them?
132. See supra note 102.
133. The Act reads as follows:
Whereas the freedom of religion for all people is an inherent right,
fundamental to the democratic structure of the United States and is,
guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution;
Whereas the United States has traditionally rejected the concept of a
government denying individuals the right to practice their religion
and, as a result, has benefited from a rich variety of religious heritages
in this country;
Whereas the religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Na-
tive Alaskan and Hawaiian) are an integral part of their culture, tradi-
tion and heritage, such practices forming the basis of Indian identity
and value systems; ...
Whereas the lack of a clear, comprehensive, and consistent Federal
policy has often resulted in the abridgment of religious freedom for
traditional American Indians;
Whereas such religious infringements result from the lack of knowl-
edge or the insensitive and inflexible enforcement of Federal policies
and regulations premised on a variety of laws;...
Whereas such laws and policies often deny American Indians access to
sacred sites required in their religions, including cemeteries;
Whereas such laws at times prohibit the use and possession of sacred
objects necessary to the exercise of religious rites and ceremonies;...
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That henceforth it shall be
the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exer-
cise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut,
and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through
ceremonials and traditional rites.
SEC. 2 The President shall direct the various Federal departments,
agencies, and other instrumentalities responsible for administering rel-
evant laws to evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation
with native traditional religious leaders in order to determine appro-
priate changes necessary to protect and preserve Native American reli-
gious cultural rights and practices....
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Though passed to acknowledge the integrity of Indian religious
practices, courts have held the Act is only a proclamation. It cre-
ates no remedy for an injured tribe and imposes no legal penalties
on the injuring party. It merely announces Congress' wish that
Native Americans be allowed to worship free from state or private
interference. Were the Act's principles enforced by our judiciary,
it could significantly enhance Native American religious freedom.
Unfortunately, courts have interpreted the Act to reflect the domi-
nant culture's religious views and to continue suppressing Ameri-
can Indian religious practices. The Act reads, in relevant part, that
it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and pre-
serve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to
believe, express and exercise [their] traditional religions, in-
cluding, but not limited to, access to sites, use and possession
of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremo-
nials and traditional rites.134
Indian litigants have brought causes of action under the
AIRFA in tandem with free exercise first amendment claims.13
5
Federal courts generally hold that the AIRFA gives Indians no in-
dependent cause of action, as that was not what Congress intended
the Act to do.136 At best, the AIRFA simply directs the attention
of federal agencies to Indian first amendment rights. It requires
those agencies to "consider" the complaints of Indian tribes before
developing public land.137
It is not clear at this time what standard federal courts will
use when reviewing the decision of a federal agency in light of the
requirements imposed by the AIRFA. The courts have not yet de-
Approved August 11, 1978.
Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)).
134. Id.
135. See e.g. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Badoni v. Higgin-
son, 638 F.2d 172, 180 (10th Cir. 1980); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n
v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 597 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785
(D.S.D. 1982).
136. Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D. 1982); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d
735, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Wilson court writes that the AIRFA requires fed-
eral agencies "to learn about, and to avoid unnecessary interference with, tradi-
tional Indian religious practices," but does not "declare the protection of Indian
religions to be an overriding Federal policy, or grant Indian religious practitioners a
veto on agency action." Id, at 746.
137. An agency complies with the AIRFA "if, in the decision-making process, it
obtains and considers the views of Indian leaders, and if, in project implementation,
it avoids unnecessary interference with Indian religious practices." Wilson v. Block,
708 F.2d 735, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1983). If building a ski slope on a hill sacred to the Indi-
ans is not "unnecessary interference" with their religious practices, one wonders
what is. In light of the Wilson court's holding, it would appear that an agency need
do no more than conduct a pro forna inquiry into complaints brought before it by
Indian tribes. No matter what the result of the agency's decision, the court will not
disturb that decision, provided some sort of nominal inquiry has been made.
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termined under what circumstances and how far they may probe
the findings of the agency decisionmaker. In Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson ,138 a federal district
court went so far as to hold that even when the agency unconsitu-
tionally violates Indian religious freedom, it may still have com-
plied with the AIRFA. If the agency provides a forum where
members of the complaining tribe are allowed to speak, and if its
records reflect that it has noted the Indian tribe's complaints, the
agency is considered to have met the requirements of the AIRFA,
regardless of whether the substance of its ruling reflects that
consideration.139
In New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Association v. ICC,140 the
D.C. Circuit appears to impose a higher standard of review. There,
the court held the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had vi-
olated the AIRFA when it failed to investigate the Navajo ranch-
ers' allegations that a company proposing to construct a railroad
line had dealt unconscionably with Navajo landowners. The pro-
posed rail line would have run across land of sacred and historic
significance to the Navajo. The Navajo plaintiffs argued the rail-
road company had used coercive tactics to obtain grants of right of
way. The court found the ICC had too readily accepted "the rail-
road's assurances that it would take appropriate steps to mitigate
the damage to historic and sacred sites."'141
The precedential value of this case for Indian plaintiffs to
halt development on sacred land is ambiguous. The Navajo Ranch-
ers plaintiffs owned most of the land across which the proposed
railroad would have run. Further, the court was troubled that the
railroad had acted unconscionably in dealing with the landowners.
How this case applies where Indians cannot claim title to the land
is unclear.
d. Constitutional rights and administrative agency
discretion.
At present, it appears the unarticulated working standard is
that where the agency has made a pro forma inquiry into the im-
pact of its proposed action on American Indian religious practices,
the agency's decision will be upheld by the courts. Yet it is courts
rather than executive agencies who bear the ultimate responsibil-
ity for ensuring that government action does not violate the consti-
138. 565 F. Supp. 586, 597-98 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
139. Id.; see also Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
140. 702 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 232.
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tutional rights of United States citizens. 142 Congress passed the
AIRFA to ensure recognition of American Indians' first amend-
ment rights. Courts are constitutionally obligated to go beyond a
pro forma inquiry into whether the agency in question "consid-
ered" the impact its decision would have upon American Indian
religion. Federal agencies are not competent to determine a
party's constitutional rights under the free exercise clause of the
first amendment. The Interior Department, 143 the Department of
Agriculture,144 and state park, forest, and game departmentsl45
lack the requisite authority and expertise to make final determina-
tions in matters involving religious freedom.
The Administrative Procedure Act 1 46 (APA) specifies the
scope of judicial review of agency decisions. The Act requires the
reviewing court to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action."147 When review-
ing an agency's decision, the court examines both factual and legal
conclusions of the agency decisionmaker.148 When considering the
factual basis of an agency's decision, the reviewing court asks if the
record contains substantial evidence to support the agency's find-
ings.149 When considering whether the agency has correctly inter-
preted a federal statute and whether its legal conclusions conform
with the laws and Constitution of the United States, the reviewing
court must make its own determination after considering the
agency's view.15o
142. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
143. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
144. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
145. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Northwest In-
dian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Crow
v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982); Inupiat Community v. United States, 548
F. Supp. 182 (D.S.D. 1982).
146. The Administrative Procedure Act is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-5701 (1982).
147. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982),
148. The scope of judicial review of an agency's factual conclusions is considered
in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Review of an agency's
legal conclusions is considered in NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
149. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
150. The Hearst Court writes: "Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpreta-
tion... are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of
those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute." NLRB v. Hearst,
322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944). See also Henry Hart Jr. & Albert Sacks, The Legal Pro-
cess: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1345-47 (10th ed. 1950).
Under the Hart/Sacks analysis, the more the agency's decision has to do with gen-
eral legal principles, the more active a role the reviewing court should assume. "Of
course, there may be hierarchies of purpose reflected in a statute.... The more
general the question, the more persuasive are the arguments that the court should
make the determination after considering the agency's view." Id. at 1346.
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Questions of law and questions of fact are not easily sepa-
rated. An agency's legal conclusions will derive from its factual
determinations just as its factual determinations depend upon in-
terpretation of statutes relevant to its decision.lS1 The Supreme
Court has, nonetheless, distinguished factual from legal issues,
holding a reviewing court has greater discretion and responsibility
when considering legal questions.152
The APA directs courts to set aside agency actions found to
be "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immu-
nity."153 Because the AIRFA specifically addresses the constitu-
tional rights of American Indians, courts should subject agency
decisions made under the Act to the de novo review required of
questions of law. The Supreme Court has gone further, holding
that when it is necessary to protect a constitutional right properly
asserted, a court reviewing an agency decision must determine if
the procedure used to determine the underlying facts was ade-
quate. For example, the Court has said agencies may not deprive
persons of constitutionally protected rights or liberties without giv-
ing them a substantive evidentiary hearing.154 Assuming federal
agencies have the authority to decide whether Indians' first
amendment rights are violated, courts must subject agency legal
conclusions to the appropriate standard of review.' 55
Under that standard, the reviewing court must independently
determine whether the agency's proposed action conflicts with In-
dian peoples' constitutionally protected religious freedom. The re-
viewing court would, therefore, examine the record to determine
151. See Roy Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action-Remarks
Before the D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference, 34 Fed. B.J. 54 (1975).
152. NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944).
153. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
154. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), holding that an executive
agency may not fashion security programs whereby persons are deprived of their
civilian employment without being given an opportunity to challenge effectively
the evidence upon which an adverse determination might rest. Such programs
deny the employee's "liberty" and "property" without "due process of law" in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment. Id. at 492, 500-02. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970), holding that state and municipal agencies may not terminate public
assistance payments to a recipient without affording him or her the opportunity for
an evidentiary hearing to termination because such termination denies the recipi-
ent procedural due process under the fifth amendment.
155. Even under the lower standard of review appropriate for a review of an
agency's factual determinations, courts reviewing agency decisions under the
AIRFA have failed to meet their obligation. Rather than examining the record to
see if the agency's conclusions are supported by "substantiality of evidence," Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951), the courts have upheld
agency decisions where the agency's records reflect that it "considered" the Indian
tribe's complaints, regardless of whether its ruling is properly supported. See supra
text accompanying note 139.
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whether the agency's proposed act conforms to Congress' mandate
that Indians be guaranteed access under the first amendment to
religious sites, and that they enjoy the freedom to worship through
ceremonies and traditional rites.156
By empowering executive agencies to decide with finality the
legitimacy of a tribe's religious claims to public land, our courts of-
fend the constitutional rights of tribal members. As presently in-
terpreted, the Act restricts the court's inquiry into first
amendment issues once an executive agency has ruled that its deci-
sion conforms to the Act.157 The agency is, of course, inclined to
so rule since it has itself initiated the action of which the Indians
complain. Though Indian litigants may still bring actions under
the free exercise clause against executive agencies and private de-
velopers in federal court, the agency's self-determined compliance
with the AIRFA will serve as prima facie evidence that it has not
violated the Indians' constitutional rights. This interpretation of
the AIRFA restricts rather than enhances the religious freedom of
American Indians. Should executive agencies become the final ar-
biters of whether their own actions violate the AIRFA, the Act
will have the unintended and ironic effect of undermining Ameri-
can Indians' first amendment rights. Though the courts insist that
the Act has no teeth,158 they interpret it in such a way that it
gnaws at the liberty of those whom it is designed to protect.
e. Black Hills first amendment cases.
(1) Crow v. Gullet
Two cases concerning the Black Hills exemplify judicial in-
terpretation of Indian religious rights under the first amendment.
The first is Crow v. Gullet.159 In 1982, the chiefs and holy men of
the Lakota Nation brought a class action suit against the state of
South Dakota. The plaintiffs contended that the state had defaced
a religious site vital to Lakota religion, and this defacement im-
pinged on Lakota religious freedom guaranteed the Lakota by the
free exercise clause. The Indians brought their action under the
156. For text of AIRFA, see supra note 133.
157. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Crow v. Gullett,
541 F. Supp. 785, 793 (D.S.D. 1982).
158. See, e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982); Wilson v. Block, 708
F.2d 735, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Wilson court quotes the following excerpt
from the congressional record: "[The resolution] simply says to our managers of
public lands that they ought to be encouraged to use these places. It has no teeth in
it." 708 F.2d at 747 (quoting from 124 Cong. Rec. 21, 445 (1978)).




Bear Butte, the religious site at issue, stands at the eastern
edge of the Black Hills. Of all ceremonial sites in the Black Hills,
Bear Butte is most important to Lakota religion. It towers over
the earth, austere and majestic. Two holy men testifying for the
plaintiffs explained that Lakota men met with the Great Spirit on
Bear Butte.161 Each year, male vision seekers of the Black Hills
tribes journey there to fulfill the Vision Quest, one of the seven
sacred rites of the Oglala Sioux. 16 2 Black Elk calls the rite "crying
for a vision." Before climbing the Butte, the vision seeker enters
160. 541 F. Supp. at 793.
161. Men are the principal participants in Lakota and Dakota vision quests. See
Black Elk, supra note 13, at 44; William Powers, Oglala Religion 91-93 (1977); Wil-
liam Powers, Yuwipi: Vision and Experience in Oglala Ritual 48-52 (1982). Most
American Indian cultures have traditionally considered it less important for women
to seek visions. See Carolyn Niethammer, Daughters of the Earth: The Lives and
Legends of American Indian Women 235-37 (1977). Women, however, participate
actively in many religious practices. Niethammer writes that among the Nez Perce
tribes of northern Idaho, and the Menominee, Potowatomi and other central Al-
gonkin groups living around the northern Great Lakes, children or young people of
both sexes participated in vigils in which they fasted and waited for visions. Fur-
ther, young women of the southeast Salish communities often sought after visions,
though young men did so in greater numbers. Joseph Epes quotes Black Elk as
saying, "[Iln the old days we all-men and women-'lamented' [sought visions] all
the time." Black Elk, supra note 13, at 44. Though Epes records Black Elk's de-
scription of the vision quest from the perspective of its male participants, Black Elk
also told Epes that "our women... 'lament' after purifying themselves in the Inipi;
they are helped by other women, but they do not go up on a very high and lonely
mountain." Id. at 46.
Women play an important role in Lakota legend. The Lakota received the sa-
cred pipe from the powerful Buffalo Calf Woman, who instructed the people in its
use before she left them. See Powers, Oglala Religion, supra, at 3-9. Because male
anthropologists have ignored the lives of American Indian women, non-Indians
know little about Indian women's religious practices. For an account of Indian wo-
men's lives, see generally Niethammer, supra.
162. Although only one person participates in a vision quest, it must be done
under the supervision of a sacred woman or man. The pilgrim performs the quest
"to gain power or to seek a vision which will help explain unsolicited visions or to
help prophesize the outcome of a hunting or war expedition." Powers, Oglala Reli-
gion, supra note 161, at 91.
The pilgrim tells the sacred person of his intention to seek a vision. If the holy
person decides to guide the would-be pilgrim, the two seal their sacred relationship
by smoking the pipe.
The sacred person prepares a place on the hill by instructing that a pit be dug
and be covered over with brush. "Saplings are imbedded in the earth at the four
directions, and they are connected at the ground by means of a string of tobacco
offering prepared in advance by the youth's relatives. The four directional poles
are decorated with colored cloth, each color symbolizing one of the four directions."
Id. at 92.
The vision seeker leaves the pit to pray and meditate. He must say prayers
while facing in each of the four directions. During his quest, the animals and birds
may visit him. Black Elk instructs that "[t]he 'lamenter' should.., notice if one of
the little birds should come, or even perhaps a squirrel.... All of these people are
important, for in their own way they are wise and they can teach us two-leggeds
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the purification (or sweat) lodge. There, he prepares for the jour-
ney and affirms his connection with the powers of the universe.
He neither eats nor drinks while undergoing purification. He then
travels to the mountain's foot, where, after making further prepa-
rations, he begins his walk up the Butte. He finds a sacred, iso-
lated place from which to seek visions through prayer to Wakan-
Tanka. He leaves sacred offerings on the Butte, as well.163
While the vision seeker, or "lamenter," may pray for many
things, Black Elk explains the "most important reason for 'lament-
ing' is that it helps us to realize our oneness with all things, to
know that He may give to us knowledge of Him who is the source
of all things, yet greater than all things." 164 To realize this one-
ness through his visions, the seeker must be isolated from all
human noise and distraction. Wakan-Tanka teaches the pilgrim
through earth's creatures and heaven's bodies. The eagle, the
morning star, the sun, the wind and the birds which ride it inspire
and participate in the seeker's visions.165
Since the state of South Dakota opened Bear Butte Park to
the public, tourists have desecrated the site and disrupted the cere-
monies. They gape at the vision seekers from wooden platforms
the Park Service has constructed for that purpose, and snap cam-
eras despite the Lakota taboo against photographing any part of
the rite. Campers disrupt the vision seekers' prayerful contempla-
much if we make ourselves humble before them." Black Elk, supra note 13, at 58.
The seeker may also be visited by Thunder-Beings, emanating from the west:
In the evenings the Thunder-beings may come, and although they are
very terrifying, they bring much good, and they test our strength and
endurance.... I remember one time when I "lamented," and a great
storm came from the place where the sun goes down, and I talked
with the Thunder-beings who came with hail and thunder and light-
ning and much rain, and the next morning I saw that there was hail
all piled up on the ground around the sacred place, yet inside it was
perfectly dry. I think that they were trying to test me.
Id. at 59-60.
163. See Black Elk's account of the vision quest in "Crying for a Vision." Black
Elk, supra note 13, at 44-66.
164. Id. at 46.
165. After the vision quest ends, the sacred advisor returns for the pilgrim. The
holy person and the pilgrim together interpret the pilgrim's vision. Black Elk gives
the following example of a "lamenter's" account:
I arose in the middle of the night, and again walked to each of the four
directions, returning to the center each time, continually sending my
voice. Just before the morning star came up, I again visited the four
quarters, and just as I reached the place where the sun rises, I saw the
Morning Star, and I noticed that at first it was all red, and then it
changed to blue, and then into yellow, and finally I saw that it was
white, and in these four colors I saw the four ages. Although this star
did not really speak to me, yet it taught me very much.
Id. at 63; see also Powers, Oglala Religion, supra note 161, at 91-93.
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tion with careless shouts and blaring electronic sound equipment.
They steal for souvenirs the offerings the worshippers leave on the
Butte. Recently, the Park Service escalated the invasion and be-
gan tearing up the sacred ground at the Butte's base to construct
access roads and parking lots.
The South Dakota court's holding in Crow v. Gullet funda-
mentally misunderstands and disregards the Black Hills' place in
Lakota religion. Even if the court had applied the same legal stan-
dard to the Lakota's claim as it would in a case involving Anglo-
European Americans, it would perpetuate the inequality between
American Indian religious practitioners and their Christian coun-
terparts. If our courts fail to recognize the Native people's reli-
gious veneration for the land, they cannot protect American
Indian religious practices, which do not separate land and spirit as
Western religions do. Crow v. Gullet, however, does less than that.
It affords the Black Hills people none of the protection courts have
traditionally granted to Christian groups.166
"It is clear to this court," writes Judge Brogue, author of the
Crow v. Gullet decision, "that plaintiffs have no property interest
in Bear Butte or in the State Park."167 The Lakota people's cen-
tury-old religious use of the Butte results in no property interest
recognized under state or federal law. Though the Lakota's lack of
a property interest is not, in theory, determinative of their right to
worship at the Butte,1 68 the court's opinion turns on that issue.
"For many years," writes Judge Brogue, "the State has adminis-
tered this area as a state park. During this time it appears that
plaintiffs' religious practices managed to coexist with the diverse
developments that occurred there."16 9 This statement assumes
Lakota religious practices have survived because the state's intru-
sions have been slight, rather than because the Lakota's religious
beliefs have been strong.
The Crow court's opinion posits a distinction between reli-
gious belief and practice. Judge Brogue reasons that the Indians
may believe anything they like-the state has not and will not co-
erce them into abandoning their religion. Yet neither will it force
166. Chris Spotted Eagle, Oglala film maker and creator of the film "Our Sacred
Land," tells how the government's treatment of the Bear Butte vision seekers dem-
onstrates the inequality perpetuated between Christian and Native American wor-
shippers: "Imagine if we flip things around, and we had Indian people dominating
the Christian churches. There would be signs on the church aisles saying, 'Don't
photograph the Christians.' We Indians would stroll in there with our popcorn and
watch you practice your religion." Northern Sun News, Nov. 1984, at 6, col. 4.
167. 541 F. Supp. 785, 791 (D.S.D. 1982), affd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
168. See cases cited supra note 111.
169. 541 F. Supp. at 791.
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the outside world to accommodate itself to Indian religious prac-
tices. Any effort the state makes in that direction is wholly gratui-
tous. Brogue writes:
This Court also rejects plaintiff's claim that the free exercise
clause obligates defendants to control the actions of the gen-
eral public at the Butte which may interfere with plaintiffs'
religious practices.... The first amendment does not require
defendants to police the actions of tourists, even though de-
fendants voluntarily urge tourists to respect the religious prac-
tices of plaintiffs at the Butte.170
The court applied the balancing test to reject the plaintiffs'
other claims as well, holding the government's interest in main-
taining the park for tourists outweighed whatever minimal restric-
tions its policies placed upon the worshippers. The construction of
roads and parking lots, reasoned the court, does not adversely af-
fect Bear Butte's spiritual significance, as that sort of "progress"
helps everybody reach the site more easily. Similarly, in the
court's view, the tourists' viewing platforms actually help foster
privacy for the worshippers because they give the tourists desig-
nated places to stand.17 1 The court concluded that the Lakota
failed to show that the construction projects now in progress
. I . have burdened any rights protected by the free exercise
clause.... We conclude that the free exercise clause places a
duty upon a state to keep from prohibiting religious acts, not
to provide the means or environment for carrying them out.172
170. Id. at 791-92. In so holding, the court quotes Brief for Appellant at 4,
Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980), that the first amendment
"gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own interests others
must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.... [Were it otherwise,
the Monument would become a government shrine.]" (brackets appear in original).
One wonders whether, under this holding, a court's decision to enjoin members of
the public from desecrating a Christian church or interrupting its services would
amount to an impermissible interference of state with church. I need not further
belabor the double standard perpetuated by these cases involving American Indian
religion.
171. 541 F. Supp. at 791. The Court cites Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 Indian L.
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981) as prece-
dent. In that case, the Hopi tribe sought to enjoin the development of the Arizona
Snow Bowl, a skiing facility in the San Francisco Peaks and the Conconino Na-
tional Forest. The Hopi claimed the free exercise of their religion required that the
mountains remain free of human disturbances. In holding against the tribe, the
court wrote:
[Plaintiffs] are essentially claiming that anyone asserting a religious
interest in government property . . . has a constitutional right to de-
mand that the government grant them access to it, yet restrict the
rights of the public to, and any development of, this property in order
to facilitate the exercise of their religious beliefs. This Court will not
extend the First Amendment to such limits.
8 Indian L. Rep. at 3075.
172. 541 F. Supp. at 791.
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This holding derives from the court's belief 1) that the Butte
"belongs" to the state, and the vision seekers come to it at the
state's sufferance; and 2) that the integrity and undefiled appear-
ance of the Butte has nothing to do with the Lakotas' ability to
practice their religion. By American Indian standards, both as-
sumptions are palpably false.173
Judge Brogue concluded the AIRFA "does not create a cause
of action in federal courts for violation of rights of religious free-
dom." 174 Congress did not intend the Act to provide American In-
dians with any rights which they did not already have under the
first amendment.175
This interpretation is correct in legal theory, but wrong as to
congressional intent. As a proclamation, the AIRFA does not cre-
ate religious rights for Indians apart from those guaranteed them
under the first amendment. By passing the Act, however, Con-
gress was seeking to ensure full recognition of those first amend-
ment rights. The AIRFA sends a message to the courts that the
purpose of the free exercise clause is to protect the religious free-
dom of every citizen. It contains an implicit criticism of past prece-
dent and a mandate to the courts to avoid defining religion solely
in terms of the beliefs and practices of the dominant culture.
Rather than provide new religious rights, the Act urges a full and
meaningful recognition of those religious rights American Indians
already have under the Constitution, but are being denied. The
Crow v. Gullet decision demonstrates the failure of the Act to rec-
tify this blindness.
(2) South Dakota v. Brave Heart.
South Dakota v. Brave Heart ,176 follows the rationale of Crow
v. Gullett and holds that South Dakota's open fire law did not pre-
vent the free exercise of Lakota religious practices. While the In-
dians may believe whatever they like, Brave Heart says, they may
not burn a fire on park land, no matter how important fire is to
the practice of their belief. The Brave Heart plaintiffs applied for
and were denied a fire permit for a religious ceremony by the For-
173. The district court also found that the state's denying the Lakota the right to
camp in the traditional campground during the construction did not violate their
freedom of religion. "In both Badoni v. Higginson and Sequoyah v. Tennessee Val-
ley Authority ," writes Judge Bogue, "the... Native Americans' right to free exer-
cise of religion was not unduly burdened even though their access to sacred
ceremonial sites was completely barred by the permanent flooding of the sites for
dam and reservoir projects." Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 792 (D.S.D. 1982).
174. Id. at 793.
175. Id.
176. 326 N.W.2d 220 (S.D. 1982).
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est Service. Fire plays a crucial role in the Lakota Sun Dance Cer-
emony. 177 The Lakota ignored the Forest Service ruling and
burned a fire during these ceremonies. 178 Law enforcement of-
ficers arrested Dewey Brave Heart and other worshippers for vio-
lating the state's open fire laws. The worshippers were convicted
and subsequently appealed. The Supreme Court of South Dakota
affirmed their conviction, relying on the Park Service's argument
that dry weather conditions justified denial of the Lakota's appli-
cation for a permit. Though the Park Service's concern for land
protection has merit, the court's holding goes beyond balancing
values to favor the Park Service. Brave Heart extends past prece-
dent in a way harmful to all Lakota religious practices, leveling
criminal penalties against people attempting to practice their
religion. 7 9
177. Black Elk Speaks, supra note 1, at 88.
178. 326 N.W.2d at 221.
179. Dewey Brave Heart and the other defendants are part of a growing move-
ment in the Lakota/Dakota community to reclaim the Hills by returning to them.
Unwilling to accept the Supreme Court's decision in Sioux Nation that a money
award compensates Indians for the government's theft of their land, many Lakota
and Dakota people have established camps in the Black Hills National Forest. The
most important of these is Yellow Thunder Camp, established by Lakota people on
April 4, 1981, on National Forest land about twelve miles southwest of Rapid City,
South Dakota. Matthiessen, supra note 17, at 526. The Lakota founded Yellow
Thunder Camp as a traditional community, in harmony with nature and centered
around Lakota spiritual beliefs. Id. at 526-31. Yellow Thunder Camp was founded
upon the principles that:
1) Spirituality is the essential foundation of Lakota culture and life;
any setting voided of this traditional spiritual centrality is not Lakota.
2) The sacred Paha Sapa [Black Hills] has always been central to
Lakota spirituality, which requires the intrinsic access to and occu-
pancy of this area.
3) Lakota spirituality is a constant and ongoing aspect of Lakota life;
all aspects of traditional Lakota life carry a spiritual significance on a
day to day, or even a moment to moment basis.... The imposition of
any other condition upon Lakota people is to effectively deny them
the right to cultural existence.
Oyate Wicaho (publication of Dakota American Indian Movement), Vol. 4, Jan.-
Mar. 1983, at 8, col. 4. On April 22, 1981, the members of Yellow Thunder Camp
applied to the United States Forest Service for a special use permit allowing them
to establish a religious, cultural and educational community in an 800-acre area of
the Black Hills National Forest. United States Marshals Service v. Means, 724 F.2d
642 (8th Cir. 1983). The Forest Service denied the request on August 24, 1981, and
ordered the camp members to leave the site by Sept. 8, 1981. The camp members
made a timely administrative appeal. Id. On September 9, 1981, the United States
filed an action against the named principals of Yellow Thunder Camp, claiming
that they illegally occupied the lands and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
On September 15, the camp members counter-sued Forest Service officials, con-
tending the Forest Service's denial of their special use permit was arbitrary, ra-
cially-motivated, and violated their rights under the first amendment free exercise
clause and the AIRFA.
In December, 1985, District Judge Donald O'Brien ruled that the Forest Ser-
vice's denial of the campers' permit violated their first amendment right to freely
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Brave Heart cites Sioux Nation as dispositive of the issue of
the Indians' property right to live and worship in the Hills. Aware
of this precedent, the Lakota had argued, in the alternative, that
they had first amendment rights to practice their religion in the
Hills.180 The Brave Heart defendants maintained that "fires are
an essential ingredient of the Lakota religious rituals, specifically
the pipe and sweat lodge ceremonies, and traditional feasts per-
formed and celebrated in their camps."181 They argued further
that "by depriving them of the use of fire, the state 'stole the
heart' of the religious ceremonies, the 'center of the [Lakota] uni-
verse,' the 'bread and wine' of their communion with the Crea-
tor."182 Implicit in the court's rejection of the defendants'
arguments is the distinction courts make between those practices
which are "indispensable" and those which are merely "central" to
Indian religion.183
The Brave Heart court writes that the Indians failed to prove
the "indispensability" of open fires to their religious practices.
"There was no evidence that these ceremonies . . . could not have
been performed using a stove, sparkproof incinerator or estab-
lished fireplace .... The record does not show that such alterna-
tives to open fire.., would have interfered with the free exercise
of appellant's religion."'1 4 To receive first amendment protection,
Brave Heart requires Indian litigants to go beyond the Yoder test
of centrality to prove their religious practice has no alternative
form of expression.
Brave Heart fails to understand how the substance of reli-
gious belief and the form of its expression are inseparable. In ef-
fect, the court is requiring Indians to change the content of their
religion to conform with South Dakota's open fire laws. The pen-
alty for refusing to compromise beliefs was severe: Dewey Brave
Heart and his co-defendants were convicted of criminal charges.I8 5
In a concurring opinion to Brave Heart, Justice Henderson
distinguishes between Lakota religion and Lakota political and
cultural life to argue that the defendants suffered no infringement
practice their religion. The court ordered the Forest Service to issue the permit af-
ter the court approves the campers' plan for the use of the land. United States v.
Means, No. 81-5131 (D. S.D. Dec. 9, 1985); Means v. Mathers, No. 81-5135 (D. S.D.
Dec. 9, 1985).
180. 326 N.W.2d at 222.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 222-23.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 124-125; Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735,
744 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
184. 326 N.W.2d at 223.
185. Id.
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of their first amendment rights.'8 6
One of the campers testified that the camp was set up in a
spiritual way but that he and his family's main purpose in go-
ing to the Hills was political in nature, namely that the Black
Hills still belonged to the Sioux..... Further, this camper
stated he wanted to draw attention to the Indian people's op-
position to settlement of money in exchange for the Black
Hills to the Federal government. He testified that life was
poor on the reservation and that he just wanted to go to the
Black Hills to camp.18 7
The appellants based their defense on the argument that for
those Lakota people living and worshipping at the camp, "the secu-
lar and religious cannot be separated."'188 The theft "sale" of the
Black Hills had offended both the political and religious convic-
tions of the Lakota people. They lost not only property rights, but
also religious freedom. The campers' political motives and their
religious motives for living in the Hills are fundamentally the
same.
Brave Heart interprets the first amendment so as to make it
inapplicable to American Indian religious practices. The Anglo-
European distinction between "practice" (something people do)
and "belief" (in context of these cases, something which people
may freely think, so long as they do not act upon it) flies in the
face of Lakota religion and way of life. For Black Elk's people,
spirit and deed, like Creator and creation, exist together and re-
ceive a single expression.
f. Indian religious freedom and the establishment clause.
(1) Lemon v. Kurtzman: The traditional approach.
Under Crow and Brave Heart, the first amendment free exer-
cise clause fails to protect Lakota religious freedom. Crow inter-
prets the AIRFA consistent with previous state and federal court
interpretations of the first amendment, perpetuating the cultural
bias of the decisions the Act intended to remedy.' 8 9 The courts
186. See supra text accompanying notes 126-130.
187. 326 N.W.2d at 223-24.
188. Id. at 222.
189. Senator Edward Kennedy, an early supporter of the act, has complained
that it has failed in its effect:
On August 11, 1978, Congress passed the American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act to emphasize our recognition of the constitutional
protections inherent in Native American religions. Underlying this
Act was the understanding that American Indian religious practices
are an integral part of the Indian culture, tradition, and heritage. In
the Act, we condemned "the lack of a clear, comprehensive and consis-
tent Federal policy.., often result[ing] in the abridgment of religious
1985]
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have gone further, however, concluding government protection of
Indian religious practices on public lands would violate the first
amendment establishment clause. In both Crow and Brave Heart,
the suggestion that government act to ensure the Lakota can prac-
tice their religion free from state or private interference was held
to promote Indian religious practices in violation of the first
amendment.190
In reaching this conclusion, the courts rely on the test set out
by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman .191 Under this stan-
dard, the establishment clause is violated if a government law or
conduct lacks a significant secular purpose, if its primary effect is
to advance or inhibit religion, and if it creates an excessive entan-
freedom for traditional American Indians." Three years later, the sit-
uation is sadly unchanged....
For far too long, Americans have perpetuated a double standard in
their view toward religions-exhibiting the proper respect for western
religious practices and their practitioners, while treating Native Amer-
ican religions in an insensitive and even sacrilegious manner. For ex-
ample, in my own state of Massachusetts, the congregation of the
historic Old North Church is given the protections that their religious
beliefs and activities deserve. Yet at Rainbow Bridge in southern
Utah, tourists are given unrestricted access to Native American reli-
gious sites. They are permitted to photograph the sacred ceremonies
and to consume alcoholic beverages at sacred locations.
In Tennessee, the TVA removed and arranged for the proper
reburial of hundreds of burial remains threatened by the opening of
the Tellico Dam. Yet 1,100 Indian remains, many of them recent buri-
als, were "stored" in local museums as "archaeological relics" rather
than returned to their tribe for reburial....
From the offices of Senator Edward Kennedy, released to the press on April 21,
1982.
190. Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982); South Dakota v. Brave
Heart, 326 N.W.2d 220 (S.D. 1982). In contrast to these decisions, there is precedent
allowing a government to act, in certain circumstances, to benefit a group's reli-
gious practices. In Amico v. New Castle County, 101 F.R.D. 472 (D.C. Del. 1984), a
district court ruled a county zoning ordinance specifying that massage parlors, adult
book stores and adult entertainment centers "shall not be permitted within... 2800
feet of a school, church or other place of worship" did not violate the first amend-
ment establishment clause. Id. at 477 n.4. InAmico the court applied the Lemon v.
Kurtzman test discussed i2'&ra text accompanying note 192. Because the county as-
serted a compelling state interest in protecting children from the influence of the
sex industry, the state met its burden even if the zoning restriction benefited
churches. Id. at 494-96.
In Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass. 83, 384 N.E.2d 1223
(1979), the state court held a statute prohibiting the granting of a liquor license to
premises located within 500 feet of a church or school did not violate the establish-
ment clause. The purpose of the statute, reasoned the court, was to safeguard the
health and welfare of persons attending the church. Id. at 87, 384 N.E.2d at 1228.
Had it been so inclined, the Crow court could have held in favor of the Lakota
on similar grounds. Restricting tourist access to Bear Butte during religious cere-
monies would undoubtedly protect the Indians' welfare and help preserve the his-
torical and environmental integrity of the Butte.
191. 403 U.S. 602, 604 (1971).
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glement of government with religion. 19 2
(2) Lynch v. Donnelly: A new approach to the
establishment clause.
In Lynch v. Donnelly ,193 decided in 1984, the Supreme Court
reinterpreted the Lemon standard. Lynch held that no single cri-
terion, including the Lemon test, can determine the constitutional-
ity of a government act which benefits a religion. The Court will
not enforce the establishment clause mechanically to invalidate all
government conduct benefiting a religion but will scrutinize the
challenged legislation or conduct to determine whether, in reality,
it establishes a religious faith or tends to do so.194
Lynch v. Donnelly arose when residents of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island, and individual members of the American Civil Liberties
Union challenged the city of Pawtucket's Christmas display as a
violation of the establishment clause. The Pawtucket residents ob-
jected to the city's inclusion of a cr6che, or nativity scene, depict-
ing Christ's birth. The creche is displayed each year in a
Pawtucket park owned by a non-profit organization. City workers
erect the display, in cooperation with Pawtucket's retail
merchants.195
The federal district and appeals courts permanently enjoined
the city from including the creche in its Christmas display. The
Supreme Court overruled the lower courts; despite the obvious
religious significance of the creche, Pawtucket had not violated the
establishment clause.196
The Lynch Court observed that total separation between
church and state is not possible, as no segment of our society, least
of all religion, is free from government's influence. Further, it
ruled the Constitution does not require complete separation of
church and state, but "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any."197 Lynch, however, cuts in two directions. The case requires
that government not only tolerate, but actively accommodate all
religions, while also ensuring its accommodation does not lead to
the endorsement or establishment of any particular religion. In-
deed, if the government were not willing to accommodate all reli-
192. Id. at 612-13. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984), discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 193-212.
193. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984), rehg denied, 104 S. Ct. 2376 (1984).
194. Id. at 1361-62.
195. Id. at 1358.
196. Id. at 1356.
197. Id. at 1359.
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gions, the Court suggests the government would be at "war with
our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guar-
anty of the free exercise of religion."1 98 Pervasive in our history,
writes the Court, "is the evidence of accommodation of all faiths
and all forms of religious expression, and hostility toward
none."1 9
On its face, Lynch's requirement of accomodation ought to
help American Indians achieve religious freedom. Under Lynch,
American Indian religious freedom litigants should face a less
stringent burden of proof than the courts have thus far imposed on
them under the free exercise standard of Yoder. While Lynch and
Yoder were decided under different clauses of the first amend-
ment, both address the issue of how far the government may in-
volve itself in the religious life of its citizens. The Yoder court set
the standard for determining when a law or government act vio-
lates a group's religious freedom under the free exercise clause.20 o
The Lynch Court articulated a standard for determining when a
law or government act establishes a religion in violation of the es-
tablishment clause. If, under Lynch, the government has an obli-
gation to accommodate the religious beliefs of all groups, then its
refusal to do so amounts to a violation of the free exercise clause
under Yoder.
Lynch should also strengthen the AIRFA's mandate by re-
quiring that courts not only "consider," but attempt to "accommo-
date" American Indian religious practices. In Crow, for example,
the court held that requiring South Dakota to halt its construction
of the parking lot and to regulate the conduct of the tourists near
Bear Butte would amount to government establishment of reli-
gion.201 Under Lynch, courts would inquire whether the govern-
ment's accommodation of the Indians' requests would, in fact,
promote or establish the Lakota religion as a national faith. Halt-
ing the construction of a parking lot and restricting tourist conduct
at and access to the Butte clearly does not present that threat.
Lynch approved as constitutional a display depicting the origin of
Christianity. This government action in support of an already
widely-held religion is far more threatening as a tacit endorsement
of that religion than is a court injunction requiring only that the
state and private citizens refrain from interfering with the practice
of a minority religious group. In Lynch, the government was ac-
198. Id. (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948)).
199. 104 S. Ct. at 1361. This assertion is untrue. American Indian religions have
been and continue to be the targets of governmental hostility. See supra note 102.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 107-113.
201. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
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tively involved in setting up the nativity scene; in Crow, the plain-
tiffs asked only that the government not interfere with their
religious practices. While civil libertarians who oppose Lynch jus-
tifiably fear that the city of Pawtucket is promoting Christian be-
liefs through its display of a creche, it would require a more active
imagination to suppose that the federal government stands on the
threshold of establishing American Indian beliefs as a national
faith.202
The Court's acknowledgment that no part of society, least of
all religious institutions, can exist apart from government should
also benefit American Indian litigants.20 3 In Lynch, Justice Bur-
ger cites numerous examples of church/state intersection. He re-
fers to the inscription on United States currency, art galleries
supported by public revenues which display Christian paintings,
and presidential proclamations of National Prayer Days.20 4 He
quotes with approval Justice Douglas' observation that govern-
mental action has "follow[ed] the best of our traditions" and "re-
202. Yet this is exactly what the courts addressing the religious freedom claims
of American Indian litigants claim to fear. In Crow, Judge Bogue writes that the
government already risks "being haled into court" by members of the public claim-
ing that it "has become 'excessively entangled' with religion." Crow v. Gullet, 541
F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D. 1982). In Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F.
Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), the federal court speculates an injunction restricting
offshore oil drilling in a restricted area sacred to the Inupiat people would, if car-
ried to its ultimate, create "a vast religious sanctuary over the Arctic seas beyond
the state's territorial waters. A claim to such a large area based on such non-spe-
cific grounds cannot provide the sort of 'serious obstacle' contemplated by Yoder."
Inupiat, 548 F. Supp. at 189. Such fears seem especially exaggerated in light of the
facts of Lynch.
203. The Lynch court seems to recognize the artificiality of placing life in reli-
gious and secular compartments. American Indians have long voiced this position.
Vine Deloria explains that because Native Americans understand religion in spatial
rather than temporal categories, they do not sever religion from other aspects of
community experience as Christians often do:
A religion defined according to temporal considerations is placed con-
tinually on the defensive in maintaining its control over historical
events. If, like the Hebrews of the Old Testament, political, economic,
and cultural events can be interpreted as religious events, the religious
time and the secular time can be made to appear to coincide. If, how-
ever, the separation becomes more or less permanent, as in Christian-
ity and Western concepts of history, then religion becomes a function
of political interpretations as in the Manifest Destiny theories of
American history, or it becomes secularized as an economic determin-
ism as in Communist theories of history. Either way the religion soon
becomes helpless to intervene in the events of real life, except in a pe-
ripheral and oblique manner.
Deloria, supra note 101, at 82.
204. President Reagan proclaimed May 2nd as the National Day of Prayer on
January 30, 1985. The President remarked, "We are all God's handiwork, and it is
appropriate for us as individuals and as a nation to call to Him in prayer." Minne-
apolis Star & Tribune, Feb. 1, 1985, at All, col. 4.
1985)
Law and Inequality
spect[ed] the religious nature of our people. '20 5 If, as the Court
says, the government already accommodates the Christian religion,
then it should also accommodate the practices of repressed minor-
ity faiths.
Upon closer inspection, however, Lynch has troubling impli-
cations for American Indian litigants. Throughout his opinion,
Justice Burger indicates the nativity scene at issue passes constitu-
tional muster because it depicts a religious belief inseparable from
"our" cultural heritage, and, by implication, inseparable from our
governmental institutions. The Court first explains the creche was
part of an annual Christmas display representing secular as well as
spiritual values. Justice Burger wrote "[w]hen viewed in the
proper context of the Christmas Holiday season, it is apparent
that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence to establish that
the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to
express some kind of governmental advocacy of a particular reli-
gious message."20 6
The secular context in which the creche is displayed some-
how qualifies its religious implications. The Court is claiming the
Christmas season plays so central a role in American culture that
its symbols transcend the tenets of specific denominations or
creeds. "The City," writes Justice Burger, "like the Congresses
and Presidents ... has principally taken note of a significant his-
torical religious event long celebrated in the Western World."207
This rationale derives from the assumption that Christian symbols
are so pervasive in our culture that an injunction ordering Paw-
tucket to remove its creche would be inconsistent with a univer-
sally shared "American" culture expressed through long-
established practices. Such practices include government aid to
students attending church-sponsored schools, and tax exemptions
for church properties.20 8
If interpreted narrowly, Lynch holds that in order for a reli-
205. 104 S. Ct. at 1361 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
206. 104 S. Ct. at 1362-63.
207. Id. at 1363. To prove that "[ojur history is replete with official references to
the value and invocation of Divine guidance," the court recounts the origin and sig-
nificance of Thanksgiving. Id. at 1360. American Indians do not share Justice Bur-
ger's enthusiasm for the holiday. Thanksgiving has become a day of mourning for
the Sioux people.
208. 104 S. Ct. at 1363. The court also cites McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961), in which Sunday closing laws were sustained even though one of their ef-
fects was to make it more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions.
The plaintiffs in Crow asked the court to forbid the drinking of alcohol at Bear
Butte during the times when the religious ceremonies were taking place in order to
foster respect for their religious practices. The court denied their request. See
supra text accompanying notes 159-175.
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gious symbol displayed by the government to be constitutional, it
must be displayed along with secular symbols. 209 Under a broader
reading of the case, the display is constitutional because it embod-
ies the beliefs and values of most American people. Like the
Christian art in the National Gallery and the prayers that begin
each session of Congress, nativity scenes are believed to reflect
universal religious values. The state's promotion of Christian sym-
bols thus derives from Christianity's historical significance to the
Western world, and the ubiquity of Christian symbols justifies
their proliferation.210 Under this interpretation of Lynch, Ameri-
can Indian litigants would be disadvantaged. Their religious sym-
bols and practice have not merged with the secular values of the
dominant culture as have Christian symbols and practices.21 1 Un-
less the Supreme Court is willing to grant minority religions the
same protection Lynch affords to Christians, its holding, in fact,
sanctions the imposition of a national religion.2 12
209. 104 S. Ct. at 1364. The Court found it significant that the Pawtucket Christ-
mas display included a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, etc.
210. The Court's reasoning here is tautological. It justifies Pawtucket's alleged
establishment of Christianity on the grounds that our government is now and al-
ways has been in the business of promoting Christian symbols. One might argue
the significant accommodation the government now makes to Christianity compels
the court to limit severely any further government establishment of that faith.
211. Of course, Native American religions have a historical significance on the
American continent which Christianity lacks. Whether our courts will recognize
this significance depends upon their willingness to acknowledge that religious be-
liefs centering around the land itself command the same respect and accommoda-
tion as do religious beliefs implicit in European history.
212. The Court's most recent decisions interpreting the establishment clause
have affirmed the principles advanced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and narrowed the
Lynch holding. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (decided June 4, 1985),
the Court, by a 6-3 margin, struck down Alabama's law allowing a "moment of si-
lence for voluntary prayer" in its public schools. Justice Stevens wrote the Ala-
bama statute was an endorsement of religion lacking any clear secular purpose, and
thus, violated of the first amendment. Id. at 2489-93. The statute thus flunked
Lynch's so-called "reindeer test." Justice Stevens stressed the record reflected that
the legislature's sole intent was to "endorse" religion. Id. Read together, Lynch
and Wallace suggest that the government must accommodate but may not endorse
a religion. The distinction is, at best, subtle.
The Court held in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985), and
in Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985), that public school districts may not fund
the education of non-public (or religious) school students at the public's expense.
In Grand Rapids School Dist, the Court struck down two programs instituted in
Michigan in which public and sectarian private schools shared teachers and re-
sources. InAguilar, the Court held New York City's practice of using federal funds
to pay the salaries of public school teachers teaching in parochial schools to be un-
constitutional. Under the New York program struck down by the Court, public
school teachers instructed educationally deprived children from low-income fami-
lies attending parochial schools.
Among the dissenters in these cases, Justice Rehnquist was the most radical.
He wrote that the Court's adherence to the "wall" metaphor between church and
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Lynch may either help or hurt American Indians, depending
upon the political and moral bent of the courts interpreting it.
The Indian community will therefore have to decide whether rely-
ing on Lynch is politically wise, given the agenda of the forces now
active in urging a return to a church-state integration. To say, as
does Lynch, that Christian symbols are merged with our national
heritage is true in a limited sense. They are the heritage of those
who have governed this nation, and thereby defined its values.
They are alien, however, to American Indians, and many other
American citizens. Reconciliation between people of differing cul-
tures cannot happen so long as a government, like William Blake's
tyrant Urizen, decrees in the name of cultural unity:
One command, one joy, one desire
One curse, one weight, one measure
One King, one God, one Law.213
g. Pillar of Fire v. Denver: Protection of religiously
important property.
Unless courts recognize and protect the religious interests
American Indians have in particular places, Lynch v. Donnelly
will be of little help to them. Though sacred space is a concept for-
eign to the dominant culture, there is some scant precedent hold-
ing that property rights may have spiritual basis. In Pillar of Fire
v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority,214 the Colorado Supreme
Court held religious faith and tradition can invest certain struc-
tures and land sites with significance deserving of first amendment
protection.215 The case arose when a church initiated proceedings
to prohibit Denver's urban renewal authority and the district court
from proceeding further to condemn the church's building. The
church petitioners claimed the site was the birthplace of their
church, and was still used for religious services. The state
supreme court ruled the urban renewal authority could not demol-
ish the building until a court hearing was held to weigh govern-
mental goals against the church's right to maintain the building.216
state "blinds itself to the first 150 years' history of the Establishment Clause."
Grand Rapids School Dist., 105 S. Ct. at 3232.
213. William Blake, The [First] Book of Urizen, 11:38-40, in Major British Poets
of the Romantic Period 61 (William Heath ed. 1973).
214. 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973), affd, 191 Colo. 238, 552 P.2d 23 (1976).
215. Id. at 419, 509 P.2d at 1254.
216. After that hearing, in Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Pillar of Fire, 191
Colo. 238, 552 P.2d 23 (1976), the state supreme court sustained the lower court's
finding against the church. The church apparently failed to establish to the trial
court's satisfaction that the site was the church's birthplace. The record also re-
flected that church members had actually attempted to sell the church at one time,
and that services were held there only occasionally. Although most American In-
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In Wilson v. Block, as part of the holding that the National
Forest Service's decision to permit private interests to build a ski
resort on government-owned mountain peaks sacred to the Navajo
and Hopi Indian tribes did not violate the Indians' first amend-
ment rights, the circuit court ruled Pillar of Fire did not apply to
the facts before it. The Wilson court wrote "[a] governmental tak-
ing of privately-owned religious property . . . involves different
considerations than does a claimed First Amendment right to re-
strict the government's use of its own land."2 1 7 The court did not
consider how the government came to "own" the peaks in the first
place. The Indians' religious practices on the peaks pre-date the
government's acquisition of them.2 1S
The Wilson court's conclusion that the Indians' lack of title
to the San Francisco Peaks materially distinguishes their claim
from the claim of the plaintiffs in Pillar of Fire is logical under
the tenets of Anglo-American property law. From the Indians'
standpoint, however, the court sets up a tautology. Because the
tribes no longer "own" their sacred lands, they must prove that
the government burdens their religious practices in order to pro-
tect those lands from exploitation. Once in court, Indian litigants
learn that because they do not own the land they wish to protect,
their first amendment argument is crippled. The legal system de-
fines "property interest" in such a way that the Indians usually
lack it, and "religious freedom" in such a way that the Indians al-
most always have it, even when the government deprives them of
access to the land from which their faith derives. The judiciary's
reasoning is not linear but circular. It confirms Black Elk's obser-
dian litigants would have a better case than that of the plaintiffs in Pillar of Fire,
the church's failure to win might encourage courts to make the Indians' burden of
proof a difficult one.
217. 708 F.2d 735, 742 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).
218. The Hopi, like the Lakota and Dakota Sioux, understand "title investment"
to land differently than does the United States legal system:
This land [tribal land the government proposed to "buy" from the
Hopi to strip-mine] was granted to the Hopi by a power greater than
man can explain. Title is invested in the whole makeup of Hopi life.
Everything is dependent on it. The land is sacred and if the land is
abused, the sacredness of Hopi life will disappear and all other life as
well.
To us, it is unthinkable to give up control over our sacred lands to
non-Hopis. We have no way to express exchange of sacred lands for
money. It is alien to our ways.
Robert Coulter & Steven Tulberg, Indian Land Rights, in The Aggressions of Civi-
lization: Federal Indian Policy Since the 1880s 208 (Sarah Cadwalader & Vine Delo-
ria, Jr. eds. 1984) (quoting Indian Law Resource Center, Report to the Hopi
Kikmongwis and Other Traditional Hopi Leaders 162-63).
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vation that "[t]here is much power in the circle,"219 and William
Blake's assertion that power's form is a "fearful symmetry."
220
III. Conclusion: The Meaning of Difference
The deep entrenchment of Anglo-European concepts of prop-
erty ownership, and precedents such as Sioux Nation and Oglala I
and II, make it unlikely the Lakota and Dakota peoples will regain
legal title to the Black Hills.221 Their struggle to live and worship
in the Hills, and to protect them from development and desecra-
tion, will, however, continue. Indian tribes throughout the Ameri-
cas persist in asserting their culturil and religious identity as they
fight to preserve their traditions, their faith, and their lands. Pro-
tecting sacred land they no longer own is an especially difficult
task for American Indians. The dominant culture defines interests
in property almost entirely in terms of legal title to it. Arguing
the first amendment free exercise clause gives them access to reli-
gious land sites is the most promising and creative strategy avail-
able to Indian litigants. Further, this argument is the most
accurate legal expression of the Indians' relationship to the land.
The courts' present unwillingness to accommodate American
Indian religious beliefs and practices under the first amendment
reveals their hostility to Indian religion and their indifference to
the land the Indians seek to protect. Courts will provide Indians
with meaningful first amendment protection only when they un-
derstand and acknowledge the relationship between Indian reli-
gion and traditionally sacred tribal land. The AIRFA should be
seen as Congress' mandate that all branches of the government, in-
cluding the courts, extend to American Indians the religious free-
dom they have historically been denied. Crow's holding, that the
AIRFA has been complied with if a state or federal agency's
records merely "note" Indian religious concerns, radically misin-
terprets the Act. The Act should not and cannot be understood
apart from the first amendment. It is more than a mere proce-
dural formality with which government agencies must comply.
The Act mandates that courts assume the responsibility for pro-
tecting Indian religious freedom under the first amendment.
Lynch reaffirms that responsiblity by directing the govern-
ment to actively accommodate the religious beliefs of all American
219. Black Elk, supra note 13, at 92.
220. William Blake, The Tyger, in Major British Poets of the Romantic Period,
supra note 213, at 56.
221. But see supra note 94 for discussion of proposed act which would give the
Indians greater control over the Hills.
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citizens. If courts narrowly read Lynch as an endorsement of the
dominant culture's religious values, the case will undermine the
freedom of minority religious groups. Worse, in a bitterly ironic
twist, Lynch could be used to institute the same religious intoler-
ance that drove Europeans to America's shores, a flight that
prompted the new Americans to persecute Native religions upon
arrival.
The legal conflicts between American Indians and the domi-
nant culture derive from fundamental inconsistencies in their re-
spective world-views. Given the white culture's numerical and
technological advantages, Indian people have, of necessity, ex-
amined and learned from those practices and approaches of the
dominant culture they found valuable or helpful to their survival.
That adaption was one of synthesis, not replacement. Throughout,
American Indians retained their traditional world-view, a view
which affirms their identity as a people.
In contrast, white Americans have failed to learn from or re-
spond to Indian beliefs and practices. What in the story of this
struggle for Indian religious freedom and the sanctity of the Black
Hills calls for such a response from our society? Why is such a re-
sponse so urgently needed? I believe a society faced with annihila-
tion ought to show a penchant for self-examination. A century
ago, the Black Hills Indians faced such a threat, and, in order to
survive, have struggled to this day to voice their convictions in a
language intelligible to their oppressor. Though persecuted, im-
prisoned, killed and ignored, the Lakota and Dakota people have
not been silenced. They continue to press their claims in the
courts of their conquerors, and, to renew commitment to their own
vision of justice in their own culture.
The same technology that made European Americans domi-
nant on this continent now threatens our own survival. Similarly,
our concept of land as an objective resource from which to reap
economic gain now imperils our existence. Around us looms the
specter of ecological catastrophe. It is now our turn to consider
the beliefs of the first American culture, and to question the integ-
rity of our own values, as articulated by our legal and cultural in-
stitutions. If we wish to live, and the mounting evidence of our
driving death-instinct makes this conclusion far from certain, then
we must learn respect for all life. As a small step toward that end,
we must recognize the legal, moral and religious claims of the
Black Hills Indian tribes. We must do so not to become better
"liberals," nor for the sake of emulating practices and adopting be-
liefs that are not our own, but to affirm the importance the land
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has for us all, building a foundation for humanity's survival.222
222. I dedicate this article to Dennis Banks and Leonard Peltier, who are in
prison for resisting the government's war against their people and their land. They
live their peoples' struggle for freedom.
